Immediately after it emerged from the heroic National Liberation War, the People's Republic of Albania made every effort to establish close links of friendship with the Soviet Union, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and all the other countries of people's democracy of Europe.

    The great friendship with all the friendly countries and fraternal peoples which we nurtured and tried to develop, to see it in practice and to strengthen ceaselessly, was founded on the National Liberation War and the blood shed by our peoples in this war against the same enemy. Despite the

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great sacrifices which we made (by fighting alone in our own country and liberating it with our own forces, and by fighting beyond our state borders to assist in the liberation of Yugoslavia), we, for our part, had a proper appreciation of the great and decisive contribution of the Red Army as well as of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army and others to this liberation. The others minimized our war and taking advantage of our proper presentation of the question on the Marxist-Leninist line, used this as if <<they did everything>> and <<without them we could not do anything>>. To them Albania was an infant which had to be bottle-fed, which had to be kept under patriarchal tutelage and the voice of which had no reason to be heard in the concert of the policy which the other countries of people's democracy pursued. As I said, in the first years this spirit of underrating us was felt most in the stands of the Yugoslav leaders, who acted in this way, not only because they were unscrupulous megalomaniacs, but also because they pursued sinister aims towards us. From the others, they wanted only an official <<recognition>> of Albania on paper, with declarations from afar, but they never wanted this recognition to take concrete form in the all-round mutual links of our country with the other countries of people's democracy, including the Soviet Union. To a certain extent, this anti-Albanian policy of Belgrade yielded results and the fact is that, while the friendly countries of people's democracy recognized us officially in 1945 and 1946, in reality they recognized us from a distance and, even worse, through the <<presentation>> which Yugoslavia made of us.

    Such a spirit and practice were developed and permitted at first, but not by us. Of course, this spirit had its ups and downs, had restraints and angry threats, until the Gordian knot was severed with the sword. But let us not anticipate. It must be said that Yugoslavia and Tito were interested in keeping us isolated. They had certainly manoeuvred and continued to manoeuvre behind the scenes in the direction of Bulgaria, too, and had success up until the moment when we received the invitation of the Bulgarian government and the

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Communist Party, in the name of Dimitrov, for our delegation to go to Sofia.

    The invitation which Dimitrov sent us was welcomed with great enthusiasm when I put it forward for discussion and approval in the Political Bureau and in the government. In the grave atmosphere of that period it was like a clear day after a stormy night fraught with dangers. I was charged with preparing the accurate formulation of the problems which we would raise and with the other technical problems, the composition of the delegation and informing the ambassadors of the friendly countries.

    First, I summoned the Bulgarian ambassador whom I thanked again and informed officially of our acceptance. Only the precise date of our departure remained to be decided jointly.

    Then, I summoned the Soviet ambassador and informed him, too. He implied to me that he had been informed by Moscow. I had no doubt about this, indeed, I was of the opinion that such an action could not have been taken without seeking the advice of Stalin. This was a special assurance for us. But we thought that the Yugoslavs, too, would have been informed. However, I summoned the Yugoslav ambassador, too, and informed him. He listened to me, took notes and said that he would immediately inform the government in Belgrade. I saw that the news did not please him and, as far as I could gather, he had not known about it.

    <<Has the Soviet ambassador been informed about this?>> he asked me.

    I replied that I had informed the Soviet ambassador. I told him also that we would talk again later when, together with the Bulgarians, we had decided the day of our departure.

    <<We shall travel through Belgrade and will seek your assistance,>> I said in conclusion.

    <<Of course!>> he replied.

    Thus, I parted from the Yugoslav ambassador in a <<good>>, <<comradely spirit>>, although I guessed that the Yugoslavs could not be pleased that we were going to interrupt our analyses and;

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postpone for later the <<Albanian question>> which they had on the agenda.

    We began and ended the preparations and set out for Sofia via Belgrade. I headed the delegation and its main members were Koçi Xoxe, Hysni Kapo, and Kristo Themelko.

    I was exceptionally happy to be going to Dimitrov's Bulgaria. Hysni, too, felt this same great joy. From the look of them, Koçi and Kristo Themelko, too, seemed to have the same feeling (but later it was realized that this was not so). This was the third time that I left the Homeland and went with official delegations to friendly and fraternal countries: the first time we went to Tito in Belgrade; the second time to Stalin in Moscow; and now we were going to Dimitrov in Sofia.

    The love and sympathy of our people, Party and government for Bulgaria and for its outstanding leader, Dimitrov, were marked. These feelings had their foundations in the long history of friendly traditions and these friendly traditions had been strengthened during the National Liberation War, irrespective of the fact that there had been few links and contacts between us and the Bulgarian partisans. In particular, the mighty figure of Georgi Dimitrov linked us closely in an unquestioned political-ideological unity. The Marxist-Leninist ideology which inspired our parties was the steel bond which united us in all our activities.

    In the past, when the Albanian people fought against the ambitions and terror of the Serbs, we were friends with the Bulgarian people and we liked, respected and assisted each other. The patriots and fighters of our National Renaissance found shelter and aid for their struggle in the bosom of the Bulgarian people; Albanian patriotic societies had been created in Sofia and there Albanian books and papers, which were smuggled into Albania, were printed. Our çetas of the time of the Renaissance and during the Balkan Wars had close fighting relations with the insurgent çetas of those parts, carried out joint actions and sheltered one another. Thus, there was a long history of very friendly links between our peoples. Our joint Anti-fascist National Liberation War strengthened

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these bonds even more; although, as I said, during the war we did not have direct contacts with the Bulgarian partisans. Only on one occasion, in 1943, Bulgaranov came to Labinot to meet me. We exchanged opinions about the war, but my impression was that the Bulgarians were weak. In fact, the Bulgarian partisan war developed slowly and flared up on a broad scale only when the Red Army entered Bulgaria. In the meeting which we had, Bulgaranov spoke well of the Yugoslavs and likewise, of our Albanian units which operated in thee districts of Dibra and Macedonia. He told us that he was delegated by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party to work with the Macedonians, whom he called Bulgarians at that time. I knew that Bulgaranov did not get along well with Tukmanovic-Tempo, who led the National Liberation War in Macedonia, but he told me that allegedly he got on well with the Yugoslavs. I pointed out to Bulgaranov that whole territories populated by Albanians had been included in Macedonia, that this was an injustice of the past and that after the anti-fascist National Liberation War the question of nationalities had to be examined according to the Leninist principles.

    <<Only from this standpoint,>> I told him, <<will the problems of these zones and nations and nationalities that live in them be solved correctly. Otherwise, the old national oppression, contradictions and conflicts will continue. During the whole period of the war against the same enemy, fascism,>> I told Bulgaranov, <<the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Albania and the Bulgarian Communist Party must work towards developing friendship amongst our peoples. We must enlighten our peoples politically in order to wipe out the bitter remnants of the past and lead them to victory; the peoples who have suffered from the injustices perpetrated by the Great Powers and the chauvinism of Balkan states must win the right to self-determination. This is what we think about the Albanians of those Albanian regions which were annexed to Yugoslavia.>>

    Seeing that I had opened the way, Bulgaranov, too, began

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to speak about the question of Macedonia, which he called part of Bulgaria.

    I allowed him to express his opinion and did not enlarge on this question. I knew that the Yugoslavs, for their part had a tendency to minimize and disparage the war of the Bulgarians. Undoubtedly, one of the main reasons for this was the question of Macedonia.

    Apart from this meeting, we had no other contacts with the Bulgarian comrades during the years of the war, but we ceaselessly cultivated the feelings of fraternal internationalist friendship for the Bulgarian people and the Bulgarian Communist Party (which, as I recall, was called the Bulgarian Workers' Party at that time). The personality of Dimitrov, who had won world fame, played a major role in this. The name of the hero of Leipzig, of the General Secretary of the Comintern, was on the lips of all the communists and anti-nazis of the world. After the great classics of Marxism-Leninism, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, we loved, admired and listened to him. Dimitrov was one of Stalin's closest friends and collaborators, therefore our going to Sofia and meeting Dimitrov was a great joy for us.

    With these pure, friendly feelings for the friendly allied countries, our delegation set out and arrived in Belgrade on December 12. The welcome which we received at the railway station was extremely cool, but <<officially>> the Yugoslavs showed themselves more than <<correct in protocol>>: Kardelj, Rankovic, Simic (at that time Foreign Minister), Hebrang (Chairman of the Planning Commission), Tempo and a number of other personalities of lower rank had come out to meet us. As I said, our visit to Bulgaria was taking place at the time when Tito and company had gone on the attack against us, therefore, the turning out at the station of all these <<top-level authorities>>, as Koçi Xoxe called them, was something of a surprise to us. However, everything had its own explanation and the Yugoslavs had carefully calculated the actions they took. In public, the great rifts which had been created in the relations between our parties and countries had still not be-

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come apparent and the Yugoslavs were striving to develop their attack in complete secrecy. Indeed, to eliminate any suspicion about this attack, they even made some gesture of <<friendship>> and <<fraternity>> towards us such as the turning out of <<top-level personalities>> at the station. But all these things were done reluctantly and coldly. We knew nothing of diplomatic rules, protocol and formalities, such as ceremonies, etc., and did not even notice these things, but the fact is that, except for a few extremely official words of greeting demanded by protocol, Tito's comrades said not another word to us. However, there was no reason for this coldness to make an impression on us. Likewise, it made no impression on us that they took us to stay in what was virtually a private house (nationalized, of course). They told us it had been the home of Stoyadinovic, the Great-Serb fascist reactionary, who, in the time of the Yugoslav monarchy, talked with Ciano about dividing Albania with Mussolini's Italy.

    Regardless of the cold reception, the accusations which Zlatic had made and the grave situation that had been created in our country as a result of these accusations, I considered it necessary to utilize the time of our stay in Belgrade for a meeting with Tito, with the aim of talking directly with him about how the truth stood. For this reason, we decided to ask for a meeting with him, even if he did not invite us himself. As allies, we also considered it proper to inform him about the aims of our visit to Bulgaria, to tell him about the importance of the treaty which we expected to sign with fraternal Bulgaria and which we considered as a reinforcement of the treaty which we had with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Naturally, on this occasion we could also exchange opinions with him about the international situation, but the main thing, if this were possible, was that we wanted to speak openly about our internal matters and the tense relations with them. This was our disposition when we arrived in Belgrade.

    At the moment when we were parting from Kardelj and Rankovic, after they took us to the gate of the house where we

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were to stay, I put to them our request for a possible meeting with Tito.

    <<Yes,>> said Kardelj, cold as a snake. <<Comrade Tito himself wants to meet and welcome you, perhaps this evening. We shall inform you at the proper time.>>

    Not long afterwards they informed us that Tito was awaiting us for a <<meeting of welcome>>.

    It is true that we were somewhat <<excited>> about meeting these <<great men>>, because that is how they presented themselves and that is how they wanted us to consider them. Whether a warm, comradely situation or a tense and frozen atmosphere was created depended on their character and stands. Two days later we were to meet Dimitrov for the first time, were to become acquainted with him and, I must say, that Tito could not compare with the outstanding leader of Bulgaria. They were as different as night from day, and I do not make this judgement from the standpoint of today, but these were my authentic impressions at that time. Tito remained haughty and cold with us, with measured, studied gestures and never allowed himself the mistake of making a gesture or saying any word which showed comradely closeness and warmth. No, nothing of the sort could be seen about him, everything was pre-considered and cold. In 1946, during the first meeting with him, we said that this might be his character, but now we were realizing that the meaning of Tito's coldness had another explanation. He wanted us, even in appearance, to stand at attention before him, as before the patriarch.

    On this occasion Tito did not receive us in the Palace of Dedinja, but in a simple house within the city of Belgrade, I think in a street which is called Rumunska. It was a pleasant two-storeyed house of the old style, encircled by a high wall. We entered the hall, where, if I am not mistaken, Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic and Djilas welcomed us. Tito was dressed in grey woollen clothing and with shoes of the same colour. He stood as stiff as a ramrod. He simply gave us his hand, while asking after our health, and, when this ceremony

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was over, led us into his office which was off to one side. It was a longish room with a window nearly as wide as the room. Near the window was his working desk and in the middle of the room another long table. Apparently, the meetings of the Bureau were held there or Tito used it to summon other people about the work. We were to take our places at the table and, as usual, they would sit on one side and we on the other.

    <<Please sit down,>> said Tito and remained standing himself. I took my seat and my comrades were preparing to take theirs, one after the other, beside me. But Tito intervened and said:

    <<Comrade Xoxe, you sit here,>> and indicated the big chair which stood empty at the head of the table. We were all dumbfounded by this action of Tito's. However, I calmly told Koçi, who was as red as a beetroot:

    <<Go there where he tells you.>>

    <<No, Comrade Marshal, I can sit here, let Comrade Enver sit there,>> Koçi replied to Tito.

    <<No, no,>> said Tito, <<come here, you, too, can sit here.>>

    I quietly told Koçi again to go where he was told. Thus this provocation was closed. We all took our seats. Tito took out his cigarette holder in the form of a pipe, put in a cigarette and lit it and then pushed the packet towards me saying:

    <<Here, have a cigarette.>>

    I told him I had given up smoking (this was not true, but I did not want to smoke his cigarettes after what he had done). Then Tito said to me:

    <<The comrades informed me that you are going to Bulgaria and, of course, you will meet Dimitrov. Are you pleased with the prospect of this visit?!>>

    I told him briefly about the purpose of our visit to Bulgaria, said that this had been a long-cherished desire, stressed the sympathy and love which the Albanian people had always displayed for Bulgaria, its people, and especially, for the outstanding leader of Bulgaria and the international communist and workers' movement, Georgi Dimitrov. I went on to

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say that we expected to hold talks with the Bulgarian comrades about strengthening mutual relations between our parties and countries and in this context we thought we would sign such documents which would reinforce not only the independence of our two countries, but also the relations between the People's Republic of Albania and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Tito listened to me with a frown on his face, his head held high, looking at me with those cold glassy eyes.

    When I had finished, Tito turned to Koçi and said with a smile:

    <<Of course, you have prepared yourselves to benefit from the experience of the Bulgarian Communist Party. . .>>

    <<We may be given the occasion to do such a thing, too, but we have unlimited possibilities to receive the experience of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at any moment and about everything,>> replied Koçi.

    From beginning to end Rankovic sat without moving a muscle of his face, merely smoking cigarettes with his long white holder.

    Then Tito began to speak. Not undeliberately, he virtually ignored everything I had said, where we were going, and what we were going to do. It was clear that with this stand he wanted to show us that it was of no importance at all to him what we were going to do with the Bulgarians. In other words, this meant that they did not like the visit we were about to make, because he concentrated his whole talk on <<the strengthening of Albanian-Yugoslav relations>>, that <<these relations have great importance for Albania>>, that <<you Albanians must struggle against shortcomings and mistakes which are noticed in the work of your Party and state apparatuses>>, in order not to hinder <<the great aid given to you by Yugoslavia>> which made <<sacrifices>> for us etc. etc.!

    My impression was that Tito granted us this meeting before our departure for Bulgaria to <<remind>> us that, whether to Sofia or to Moscow or anywhere else, <<our road passed

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through Belgrade>>. By talking in this way he <<set the limits>> for us with the Bulgarians.

    I thanked Tito for <<his valuable advice>>, assured him sincerely about the love which we continued to nurture for the friendly and fraternal Yugoslav peoples and, just as I was preparing to start on our problems in which, according to him, we had <<mistakes and shortcomings>>, he stood up.

    <<We shall have the opportunity when you return from Bulgaria,>> he said, and walked out of the room, inviting us to watch a film together.

    After the film, from which I can remember nothing at all, they gave us a coffee, or as they say in Gjirokastra, <<the time-to-go coffee>>. We shook hands and parted. We thought that we would have no other contact with the Yugoslav leaders. But they had proposed to Koçi Xoxe individually and without my knowledge that he should meet with Rankovic or Koçi had sought such a meeting himself. Most likely, however, Rankovic asked to meet Koçi.

    This occurred that evening before we left by train for Bulgaria. We were resting before dinner when Koçi and Shule came into the room where I was sitting with Hysni and said to me:

    <<Comrade Enver, Shule and I are going to go to meet Marko (Rankovic) and discuss with him how the work of the Party should be organized at brigade and division staff level.>>

    <<Wouldn't it be better when we come back?>> I asked him. <<Make the request now and you'll have more time on our return.>>

    <<No,>> replied Koçi, <<it's better to get it over and done with this evening and then our minds are at rest.>>

    <<All right,>> I said, <<off you go.>>

    Koçi and Shule went to see Rankovic while Hysni and I stayed in the house, indeed we did not wait dinner for them because the Yugoslav comrade accompanying us <<advised>> us to have dinner, since the <<comrades might be late>>.

    When they returned from the meeting, both Koçi and Kristo looked satisfied and happy, because they had received

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<<detailed and complete explanations about the method of work of the party at brigade and division level>>. The outcome of this night-time meeting between Rankovic, Koçi and Shule was to emerge in Sofia.

    The reasons which Koçi and ShuIe gave for their visit to Rankovic in these circumstances did not convince me in the least, and no doubt, did not convince Hysni, either, but we said nothing to each other; we pretended that we found the visit natural.

    The next day we left for Bulgaria. Anton Jugov and many other comrades of the Bulgarian leadership welcomed us very warmly at the border. We embraced and kissed like the closest comrades and brothers. They brought us best wishes from Dimitrov and told us that he personally and all the other comrades of the party leadership and the government would welcome us at the main station in Sofia. Our first contact with the representatives of the Bulgarian people was warm and moving. Ordinary people embraced us, welcomed us and wished us success on our visit and in strengthening the mutual relations between our two countries and peoples. I greeted them with a brief statement in which I expressed the great feelings of love which the Albanian people nurtured for the fraternal Bulgarian people and our belief that our friendly relations would steadily advance, and ended by calling:

    <<Long live your great leader Georgi Dimitrov!>>

    The people burst into a long ovation. In accord with the national tradition they gave us bread and salt, while a young girl presented me with a beautifully embroidered traditional Bulgarian costume.

    <<Each stitch in this costume is an expression of love for the Albanian people from the Bulgarian people,>> she said, her eyes filled with tears of enthusiasm, and embraced me.

    In this atmosphere we set out for Sofia.

    We arrived. A great crowd had turned out to meet us, headed by the leadership and the great Dimitrov, with his manly face graven like a true revolutionary, with his long

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hair blowing free, because he had removed his fur cap, despite the cold and the falling snow. He welcomed me on the platform, gave me his hand, pressed me to his chest and kissed me. It was a very moving moment for me. I flung my arms round his neck and did not release him. My eyes were filled with tears of emotion, because the day had come that the Party and the people sent me here to meet this great teacher of the proletariat, from whose example, teachings and advice I had learned, as his loyal pupil, how to stand and fight against the fascist invaders, against enemies of the people and the working class for the liberation of my Homeland, for the formation and tempering of my Party, for socialism and communism.

    When the ceremonies at the station were over, we got into cars to go to the premises of the Bulgarian government. Dimitrov and I were in the first open car and we passed through long lines of people crowding the streets, the foot paths, the squares, the windows and balconies. Albanian and Bulgarian flags, portraits and slogans about Albanian-Bulgarian friendship could be seen everywhere. What boundless love of the people for Dimitrov, for Stalin and for Albania! The square in front of the palace was packed with people. From the balcony of the palace we were to greet the fraternal Bulgarian people.

    Before we went out on the balcony we stayed very close to Dimitrov. He was great in his exemplary modesty. He asked me about our people, our Party, our comrades. He spoke Russian while I spoke Albanian, because I knew very little Russian.

    When we came out on the balcony, amidst ovations from the people, the voice of Dimitrov boomed out. He had a powerful, resonant voice though his breathing was laboured because it was hindered by asthma; he spoke with enthusiasm, with fire, with boundless love for our people. While listening to him I had my gaze fixed on him and in my mind I recalled his titanic struggles, the torture and suffering he had undergone for the cause of the world proletariat, thought about this proletarian who could never be broken, but who

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rose continually like Antaeus, amidst the storms, for the triumph of the revolution.

    My speech, too, was warmly received by the people of Sofia, because it was simple and expressed the ardent love and deepest feelings of our people and Party for the Bulgarian people, the Communist Party of Bulgaria and Dimitrov personally. I gave a brief outline of the history of our people in the past and during the National Liberation War, of our close Leninist links with the Soviet Union, with the heroic Red Army, with Stalin, and with Dimitrov's Bulgaria. I also mentioned our relations with the new Yugoslavia.

    In the official joint talks of the two delegations, I spoke on behalf of our delegation and Dimitrov on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation.

    I made a relatively lengthy exposition in which I described the development of the National Liberation War and the principles which guided our war. I related how the first foundations were laid and the people's state power was created during and after the war; I spoke about the formation of çetas and the National Liberation Army in the heat of battles and actions; about the mobilization of the people and the creation of the National Liberation Front. I described what policy we pursued in connection with the Front and the main forms of the work, pointing out the historical fact that the Front was led by the Communist Party, that neither in the Front nor outside it did we have other parties within the country. Then I spoke about the Party, without which nothing could have been achieved, spoke about the directives which we received from the Comintern, etc., etc.

    I went on to give an outline of the general political and economic situation and very briefly touched on our relations with Yugoslavia. Of course, this was neither the place nor the occasion to go into detail about our relations, whether good or bad, with Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav leadership. What was going on in Tirana in connection with these relations I tried to keep deep within myself, to avoid implying to the Bulgarian comrades or anybody else that something bad was

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occurring between us and Tito. Later, when the moment came, when the situation had ripened and become clear, then everything would be stated openly. The Bulgarian comrades themselves did not give us the occasion and did not ask us to go into detail about our relations with Yugoslavia. They had displayed Tito's portrait along with the portraits of Stalin, Dimitrov and me, and they, too, spoke only in general about their friendship with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, their joint road for the construction of the new life, and that was all.

    In my exposition, then, I got over the question of Yugoslavia without any embarrassment and pointed out to the friends that our internal political situation was strong, but that we were struggling against numerous, all-round difficulties for the development of our economy.

    I spoke about the subversive activity of the Anglo-Americans. We were waging a continual war against agents dropped from the air, landed from the sea, or infiltrated over the border from Greece, and the latter country was carrying on ceaseless unrestrained propaganda making claims to Southern Albania and remained <<in a state of war>> with the People's Republic of Albania. I stressed that all this propaganda and subversive activity did not frighten our people at all, but on the contrary, they were being strengthened and tempered, increasing and sharpening their vigilance day by day.

    Comrade Dimitrov congratulated me on my exposition and, to tell the truth, I retain to this day the impression that I had passed a great test, because I was worked up about being in the presence of Dimitrov, although, amongst all the great leaders that I have ever met, he was the most unpretentious. The respect and love which I had for him were precisely the factors which increased my emotion.

    After I had spoken, Dimitrov rose and made a fiery speech about our friendship and especially about our people and their heroic wars.

    We listened with the greatest attention to his words, to his profound thoughts when he spoke about the important

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role of the Soviet Union and the great Stalin in the question of the crowning with success of the Second World War and the establishment of the new order in our countries. He opened to us a broad horizon about the problems of the foreign policy of our socialist countries, together with the Soviet Union, and the savage policy of Anglo-American imperialism and its satellites, against which we had to wage a stern fight in all fields. Dimitrov touched on the question of Greece where monarcho-fascist reaction ruled, as well as on the disturbed and unstable situation in neo-fascist Italy and stressed:

    <<They will be powerless to harm Albania because the new People's Albania knows very well how to defend itself and we shall defend ourselves together.>>

    Going on to mention the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid between Albania and Yugoslavia, Dimitrov, in the name of the Bulgarian government and people, proposed that a treaty of friendship and mutual aid should be signed between Albania and Bulgaria, also, which we had foreseen, too.

    Our enthusiasm reached its climax. I stood up and in a brief and moving speech, because I could hardly speak from joy and emotion, I said:

    <<We are completely in agreement with your proposal. Our people and government will be extremely happy and grateful. This is a day of historic importance for our people,>> etc.

    We embraced and kissed. There had never been a happier day for us. It seemed to us that we had gained the heavens. We would make even more secure the borders of our Homeland for the freedom of which our people had shed so much blood through the centuries.

    I am not going to speak about the ceremonies and visits which our delegation made in Sofia to the different institutions and factories, because there were many of them, and after all these years I cannot remember them all one by one, but the enthusiasm and love which the Bulgarian working people and working class displayed for the Albanian people have remained unforgettable for me.

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    In one great festive evening in Sofia they awarded me the title <<Honorary Citizen of Sofia>> and I remember that that evening we sang and danced with ordinary citizens and the Bulgarian leaders, just as if we were in Albania.

    At one moment (I don't remember whether it was during this evening or at the dinner he put on to welcome us) Dimitrov said amongst other things:

    <<Our people honour and respect your people and your wonderful traditions and qualities. Since the time of my childhood I've heard the saying amongst our people, 'May you be as dauntless as the Arnauts, i.e., the Albanians.' Your quality of never bowing your heads in the face of any difficulty or danger is very well known amongst us.>>

    I looked at him carefully right in the eye in order to understand whether he had said this quite casually or had something else in mind, but I was unable to discover anything. He smiled at me and raised his glass.

    <<Yes,>> I said, <<this has been a feature of our people over the centuries. They have been attacked by many enemies, have done battle with them, have shed their blood, have made great sacrifices, but have never bent the knee. Now that we have the Party this feature is being further strengthened. We shall never give way in the face of any difficulty or obstacle, Comrade Dimitrov.>>

    <<Good luck!>> he said and we clinked glasses. <<Long live your people!>>

    As I said, there were many visits and they were very cordial. At one cooperative that we visited they took us to a field of strawberries. I remember that we were accompanied there by Traicho Kostov, a deputy prime minister and minister of internal affairs of Bulgaria (the Bulgarian counterpart of Rankovic who was condemned after the exposure of the Titoite betrayal and rehabilitated when the Khrushchevites came to power), as well as by Georgi Traikov, general secretary of the Bulgarian Popular Agrarian Union, who at that time was deputy prime minister and later was elected president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Peo-

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ple's Republic of Bulgaria. Men and women welcomed us there. After we talked, an old man asked me about Georgi Traikov:

    Who's that?

    I told him who he was, but the old man got up and said to him:

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indelible impressions to the residence in which we were staying, a palace of ex-King Boris. After we sat down in the sitting-room to smoke a cigarette and to talk over the impressions we had from the dinner, we went to our bed-rooms. But I could not sleep. In my mind's eyes I was going over the impressions of the meetings and the warm words of Dimitrov, calling back to my mind his life of the undaunted fighter, the efforts and sacrifices he had made for the cause of his people and the world proletariat. It must have been well past midnight when I heard a knock at the door. I got up and opened it. At the door-step were Koçi Xoxe and Shule with frowning faces.

    <<What has happened? Have you still not gone to sleep?>> I asked.

    <<We've not gone to sleep because we want to talk with you,>> said Koçi.

    <<Is it that urgent?>> I asked. <<Couldn't you wait till next morning?>>

    <<Shule and I are so worried that we could not sleep,>> said Koçi Xoxe. <<So we want to talk now!>>

    I stared at them fixedly for a moment, told them to wait for me in the sitting-room till I threw something on my back and uent inaide [went inside? -- DJR]. Hysni had heard the knocking at the door of my bed-room and the voices after midnight and appeared at the door of his bed-room.

    <<Come, Hysni,>> I said. <<Koçi and Shule have something urgent to tell us!>>

    We sat down in the sitting-room and Koçi Xoxe began saying:

    <<I and Shule did not like your speech at the dinner and do not agree with what you said about Dimitrov!>>

    I opened my eyes in astonishment and shot a glance at Hysni, who was just as astonished as I was.

    Koçi continued:

    <<We are not in agreement with all those epithets you used about him. We don't say that Dimitrov is not an outstanding man, but you gave him a major role.>>

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<<I made no mistake in what I said. I did not exaggerate anything about Dimitrov,>> I replied. <<I should have said more, because he deserves it. It's you who are wrong, although I don't understand how such a thing causes you so much torture that you can't sleep for it! Not only ought we to speak of Dimitrov,>> I continued, <<but the whole revolutionary and progressive world has spoken about him in ardent terms which he fully deserves!>>

    Hysni intervened angrily, talking my side:

    <<What are you saying? What are these out-of-place things?! Everything in Comrade Enver's speech was correct!>>

    Koçi jumped up and said:

    <<That's what you think, but we think otherwise, we disagree with you.>>

    <<We'll settle this matter in Tirana,>> I told them in a stern tone. <<This disagreement must not hinder us from carrying out our work with success and accomplishing the task with which the Party and the government have charged us.>>

    <<Yes, yes,>> exclaimed Koçi, <<but in all that speech in which you praised Dimitrov so much you ignored Tito completely and did not say one word about him. I do not agree that Dimitrov should outshine the grandeur of Tito, his capacity and reputation as an outstanding revolutionary. Tito is the greatest figure and the most brilliant image of the peoples of the Balkans. You said, 'Dimitrov is an outstanding international figure', but this must be said about Tito, because he really is such a figure, and Tito's Yugoslavia today should become the very centre of the peoples of the Balkans.>>

    Then, I realized why they could not sleep and what all this <<concern>> was about and why they disagreed with us. I immediately remembered their meeting with Rankovic in Belgrade and understood the whole significance and reason for that meeting, allegedly to receive party instructions, but, in fact, to receive directives to keep us under surveillance lest we go beyond the limits dictated by the Yugoslavs, <<to correct>> us and to act in support of the secret directives of Tito-Rankovic.

    I told Koçi and Shule:

    <<This is a provocation you are committing, because I think that a toast at an official dinner in Bulgaria was not the place to speak of the merits of Tito. I mentioned Tito when I spoke of our friendship with Yugoslavia, and it seems to me that this was correct and sufficient, therefore, I do not budge from my opinion.>>

    <<We do not agree with you!>> persisted Kristo and Koçi red-faced.

    <<Neither do I agree with you. We shall discuss this question in Tirana. Now let us go to bed because we have work to do tomorrow,>> I said curtly and stood up.

    <<I'm in full agreement with the opinion of Comrade Enver,>> interjected Hysni and we went to our bed-rooms to lie awake all night.

    This was the first incident that occurred in Bulgaria with Koçi and Kristo. There was to be another, this time in the form of an <<amendment>> to a document which we were to sign in connection with the development of trade between the two countries. It was a simple normal document drafted in principle, as is done in such cases. The two <<adherents to principles>> (put up to this by Rankovic) told me that we should add to the text the words <<in agreement with Yugoslavia>>.

    I told them that it was not good for us to ask for such a thing to be put in.

    <<In practice no one ties our hands to prevent us acting as we see best,>> I went on. <<If we see it beneficial we sell and buy in Bulgaria, too, of course, first of all fulfilling the obligations we have under the agreements signed with Yugoslavia.>>

    However, since it was impossible to convince them (they were convinced about dependence on the Yugoslavs), in the end I said:

    <<Propose some sort of amendment and discuss it in the preparatory commission.>>

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    The moment came when we were to go to Kritchim, where we were to sign the agreements. On the way we visited historical sites, factories and cooperatives. Everywhere we were welcomed with indescribable joy and enthusiasm. Along the railway great masses of people standing in the snow cheered <<Hurrah!>>. The train stopped, we were given gifts, started again, and thus we arrived at the place, the name of which I can't remember, where we were to leave the train and go to Kritchim by car.

    When the train stopped the cheering crowd broke through the cordons and blocked the road. Dimitrov and I were the first to struggle through. Dimitrov said to me:

    <<They'll be here a long time. If we wait for the comrades we'll be caught up in the people again, therefore let you and me get in the car and 'break through'>> (in a word, he meant like the comitadjis of old). And that is what we did. Dimitrov, I and the guard drove ahead through the snow. The convoy was a long way behind.

    <<We have no security guards, brate,>> the driver said to Dimitrov.

    <<Drive on! We have the people to protect us,>> replied Dimitrov.

    Near Kritchim the people had blocked the road.

    <<You must speak to them!>> Dimitrov said to me. <<In Russian?>>

    <<How can I speak to them?>> I said. <<I know a little Russian, but I can't speak with those few words I know.>>

    <<Davaj,>>* said Dimitrov, <<you speak Albanian, because even without knowing Albanian, I'll translate faithfully for you, since I know what you want to say to them, for our feelings are the same, we have the one heart.>>

    And that is what we did. We stood up in front of the people, I spoke in Albanian with a few Russian words, and the dear old man translated into Bulgarian.

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When we got back into the car Dimitrov said to me:

    <<The peasants won't be surprised how I know Albanian, because the Bulgarians and the Albanians have always been brothers and comrades-in-arms.>>

    Dear, beloved Georgi Dimitrov, honey flowed from your mouth, as our people say!

    Finally we reached Kritchim. Kritchim is a big village where the kings of Bulgaria had the best lands and had built a beautiful hunting palace, both for summer and winter. In this palace, which was now the property of the Republic, we were the guests of the Bulgarian party and government and Dimitrov personally. In this beautiful place there was a marvellous park, with flowers growing in open beds and in hot-houses, which flourished and bloomed winter and summer. There they cultivated many kinds of trees, including some tall strong coniferous trees called sequoia, brought from Canada, as they told us. In this park they kept and fed animals and birds which had been tamed and acclimatized.

    Here something unexpected and unpleasant happened through Kristo Themelko. On the second day he had got up early in the morning, taken a shot-gun and gone out into the park. When we had all gathered downstairs Shule came in <<triumphantly>> carrying a big dead bird.

    <<I shot it in the park,>> he said proudly.

    <<What have you done!>> exclaimed Yugov. <<These are rare birds which we protect. We don't kill them, they are the ornaments of the park. But it doesn't matter!>> he added to cover his annoyance. Kristo Themelko's feathers drooped worse than those of the bird he had shot. We felt very sorry and ashamed about what had happened.

    In Kritchim we ended the talks, concluded and signed the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Aid. It was a solemn moment, especially for my comrades and me. The signing was done in the entrance hall. There a big table had been placed at which Dimitrov and I sat. We signed the documents, exchanged them, shook hands with each

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    Then I asked Dimitrov what he thought about our Party and its line during the war and now.

    He replied:

    <<It is a courageous, revolutionary party of the new type, as Stalin teaches us. The line of your Party has been correct. As far as I can judge it has shown maturity in the mobilization of the Front and the rallying of the people in it. Since there were no bourgeois parties in your country, you did well that you did not permit or encourage the formation of them, because they would have caused you difficulties, as they are trying to cause us. Look here, Comrade Enver,>> continued Dimitrov, putting his hand on my knee, <<keep the Party pure! Let it be revolutionary, proletarian and everything will go well with you!>>

    Dear Georgi Dimitrov! What he told me as we drove through the snow that morning in Kritchim is implanted in my mind and my heart forever. As long as I live I will be faithful to it and will fight to ensure that the Party is revolutionary and proletarian!

    These were unforgettable moments, unforgettable days for our people and especially for me.

    We parted from sister Bulgaria, from the great Dimitrov, from the Bulgarian people and comrades with tears in our eyes, thanking them from our hearts for their hospitality, for the great and sincere friendship which they displayed for our people, for the Party and the People's Republic of Albania.

    All the members of the delegation were very happy at the prospect of returning to the Homeland and informing the people and Party about the great political results which we had achieved. In regard to aid in the economic field, despite the great poverty in our country, we did not ask for any on account of the fact that the Bulgarians were in great difficulties, too, and the Soviet Union was assisting them. For their part, they did not make any concrete proposal either, but, of course, the way was open to reciprocal trade and to the according of some credit when the situation became more favourable for them.

    Even Koçi Xoxe and Kristo Themelko seemed happy. I

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had the impression that they had understood the stupidity of what they had done and I thought that that unpleasant scene was forgotten. I thought that the very close and friendly stand of Dimitrov and all the Bulgarian comrades towards us, our Party and our country had caused them to assess their stand towards the course followed by our Party, especially in its relations to the Yugoslav leadership, in a different light. They should have realized that for us, neither the world, nor socialism began and ended in Yugoslavia. They should have understood that our Party, our country had their own role and importance which we had to ceaselessly safeguard and strengthen. Hence, it was the opportunity for them to start to clear the rubbish out of their heads. I saw a certain joy in their eyes and gestures, and our train journey through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia towards Belgrade passed happily. We sang, asked the Bulgarian and Yugoslav guards about the places we were passing through and they explained to us where battles had taken place, etc. We asked one another: Will Tito receive us?

    As I said, when we passed through Belgrade he told us that we would talk about <<our relations>> when we returned and I knew that if they began, these talks would be extremely difficult. Nevertheless, matters had to be carried through to the end.

    However, as soon as we arrived at the railway station in Belgrade it was obvious that talks were not going to take place. Apart from an even more frigid atmosphere than the last time, now only a few third- and fourth-rate officials had come to meet us. We got into cars and, after they took us to the same place where we stayed before, they prepared to depart in order to leave us <<in peace>>. I asked the one who had been appointed to <<accompany>> me, or more correctly, to see me off, whether he knew when we were to meet Tito according to the promise made.

    <<Comrade Tito,>> said the official <<officially>> left two days ago for a friendly visit to Rumania!>>

    I nodded my head to let the official know that I under-

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stood everything clearly and held out my hand to him. Neither he nor the others made any proposal for a program or suggested a meeting with any other comrade of the Yugoslav leadership. And I made no request either. The next day we set out for and arrived in Tirana.

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    The <<analyses>> which began in our leadership after the accusations which they made through Savo Zlatic and after the suicide of Nako Spiru convinced the Yugoslav leadership that its strategic plan for turning Albania into the 7th Re-

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public of Yugoslavia was proceeding as had been envisaged. In order to disguise themselves before giving the final blow the Yugoslavs made a temporary <<retreat>>. They no longer attacked us directly, began to murmur about their <<feelings of friendship>> towards sister Albania and loudly advertised the <<aid>> which they gave us, on paper, of course. All over Yugoslavia, at meetings and rallies, on the radio, in the press, etc., they said that <<in grave and difficult days we stand beside our Albanian brothers>>, that <<for all our poverty we must save something and send it to Albania>>, and indeed, with collection boxes in hand, the Titoite jugglers even organized campaigns to collect charity for <<the poor>>.

    All this was a truly insulting and demagogic farce worthy of those who want to cover up and disguise tragedies with buffonery. Especially at the moments when we were to set out for Bulgaria this farce was played with greater fervour, Tito sensed that the unexpected invitation which we received from Dimitrov to visit Bulgaria was not something fortuitous: undoubtedly he saw in it the intervention of the Soviets and, first of all, of Stalin.

    At the same time, this <<popular internationalist aid>> which was trumpeted inside and outside Yugoslavia was to serve the leaders of Belgrade as that layer of powder which is sprinkled over a massacred corpse. They hoped that the Albanian people would be blinded by the Yugoslav buffonery of <<solidarity>> and not realize that they were being stabbed in the back.

    We ourselves now saw that something unpleasant and evil was being hidden behind all this <<beautiful>> facade. When Belgrade smiled, we had the feeling that something evil was being prepared for our Party and country. <<The stick and the carrot>>, the accusations and <<promises>> of Tito and his henchmen were being felt and seen in their true light, as links of a chain, in Tirana.

    However, in all this farce of <<friendship>> we saw the other side of the medal: the fever of fear and anxiety which haunted the chiefs in Belgrade, step by step, in the crime

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their sense of the <<capability>> and <<capacity>> of the <<great and powerful Yugoslav state>> began to be cultivated and developed. This was apparent in the military sector as in all other sectors.

    Taking advantage of those links which had been created during the war years between our two parties (and this we regarded as a normal and necessary thing), the Yugoslavs aimed to leave our army in a deplorable condition, without organization and without sound leadership.

    Initially we asked them to give us the regulations they had, with the aim that we would study them and adapt them to our conditions. They sent them very readily, accompanied with <<specialists on the regulations>>. However, they caused us a great deal of trouble. Every three to four months the regulations were changed. The training was not carried out on a studied basis, but just as it pleased one or the other Yugoslav <<specialist>>.

    The reason was not that they did not know. No, they wanted to leave our army weak and disorganized, with the aim that it would not be able to take counter-action against them later when the appropriate moment came.

    A damaging role in this situation was played by Kristo Temelko, the Director of the Political Directory of our Army, who had fought well and was sincere, but after the Berat Plenum, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo got their hooks into him, having in mind that he was of Macedonian origin, and he was implicated in the ranks of the elements who worked in favour of every <<orientation>> that came from Yugoslavia.

    I frequently summoned Shule and asked him angrily:

    <<What is this? Further changes to the regulations?>>

    <<Don't misunderstand us, Comrade Commander!>> he said. <<We are in the first steps. We are going to build a modern army. At the time when we had none at all, the first regulations were a good step towards modernization. When the second ones came, obviously, they were improved. Later they changed them again. They work, these clever devils, rack

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their brains and regulate the regulations. There is no end to perfection, Comrade Commander!>>

    <<That's all very well, there is no end to perfection, but this situation must come to an end,>> I told him. <<What is this? As soon as our soldiers start to learn one set of regulations you replace it with another!>>

    <<It's all to the good.>>

    <<No,>> I said, <<this is disorganization rather than organization.>>

    I saw that the situation was not changing and discipline was falling apart. I observed that, although I was Commander-in-Chief, I was virtually pushed to one side, in order to deal with <<the most important things>>, a little of everything. Things could not proceed in this way. Nako, as one completely involved in the game which was being played <<far from me>>, brought me all kinds of unpleasant facts and stories which he learned from his <<men>>. I was convinced that the army must be taken firmly in hand. Among the first measures which I decided to take was the reorganization of the General Staff. When we discussed this question, Nako proposed insistently that Mehmet Shehu should be placed at the head of the General Staff because he was <<a born soldier, well trained, who had proved himself>>.

    <<It's true he has proved himself,>> I told Nako, <<but from two aspects, both good and bad.>>

    As to his bad aspects I had in mind especially his sectarian acts during the war, as well as the other fact that when we had criticized him for his sectarianism, he had swung to the opposite, to opportunism. I had in mind also that he frequently acted on his own, he was conceited, demanded discipline from the others, but was not all that disciplined himself towards the line of the Party and the orders of the General Command, to the point that during the National Liberation War he did not carry out the order for the movement of the 1st Division to the north, until he was given a second clear-cut order.

    These were the things I had in mind in regard to Mehmet Shehu's negative aspects when Nako proposed to me his

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appointment as chief of the General Staff. Of course, from what we knew of him at that period, I also took account of his positive aspects, which impelled me to believe that under the leadership of the Party he would rid himself of those negative traits which we recognized in him. Likewise, the fact that he was studying in the Military Academy in the Soviet Union added to my hope that Mehmet Shehu would strongly oppose the mish-mash which the Yugoslavs we creating in our army. With people like Tahir Kadare, Nexhip Vinçani and Pëllumb Dishnica, and some others, the situation could not be corrected.

    We put forward the proposal in the Bureau and, after some minor hesitations, even Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo agreed. We summoned Mehmet Shehu from Moscow, where he was studying in the <<Voroshilov>> Academy, and at our first meeting I told him about the situation in our army, related the history of the Yugoslav regulations and before I had really finished he burst out with extreme expressions as was his habit:

    <<The brilliant military strategic art of the Red Army will find its most complete affirmation in the whole life of our army. We shall place the regulations of the Soviet Army in the hands of every soldier and will not allow even a full-stop or a coma to be altered in them. . .>>

    <<This is not what's wanted, either,>> I told him. <<We long ago gave the orientation that we should have our own regulations, which should not be just a complete translation of the regulations of sister armies. The mistake the comrades have made up till now has been that they have based themselves only on the Yugoslav regulations which have been time after time. We must not permit such anomalies any more. Account must be taken of the Soviet regulations, first of all, and the good points of the Yugoslav regulations must be looked at, but we must work to ensure that our regulations are based on our own experience, with the objective that in the future we shall have regulations which are completely our own.>>

    <<This is what I wanted to say,>> replied Mehmet Shehu.

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backing down and promising solemnly: <<We shall decide everything in a creative way, on the basis of the line of the Party and our rich experience of the National Liberation War.>>

    Thus, applying the Stalinist art in the organizational and ideo-political structure of the army in our conditions, we decided to adopt the Soviet military regulations as the base. At the same time we asked Stalin to send us some Soviet military advisers as well, to assist in the organization of the General Staff and the detachments. Stalin sent us good men with military and political experience.

    This course which we pursued consistently did not please the Yugoslavs. They considered themselves <<insulted>> and their military attaché and his aides slandered and criticized everything and incited our officers against the Soviet advisers, the Soviet regulations and the Soviet experience. A certain Spiro Serdjentic, a Yugoslav officer who had come allegedly to exchange the political experience of the Yugoslav army with the Political Directory of our Army, but who in fact maintained contact with Kristo Themelko, Pëllumb Dishnica, etc., displayed special activity in this anti-Albanian and anti-Soviet campaign.

    Although we attacked them, these actions were being carried out continuously, reaching the point when some of the Yugoslavs, beginning from the main ones, like Ambassador Josip Djerdja and Tito's <<adviser>> to us Savo Zlatic, etc., were so blinded by indignation that they took our officer comrades who had graduated from the military schools and returned to their Homeland for Soviet officers, and <<complained>> to us about this large number of <<Soviet advisers>> which we were bringing in. Later they made another attempt to set us on a wrong course. They summoned Kristo Themelko, Mehmet Shehu and some others to Belgrade, to a military meeting or seminar, at which Vukmanovic-Tempo (at that time political director of the Yugoslav army) presented <<the military theses of the Yugoslav army>>. After this, through Shule, they tried to persuade us that we, too, should adopt those anti-Marxist and openly anti-Soviet theses. Kristo Themelko,

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indoctrinated by Tempo, came to me all enthusiasm, praised these theses to me, and proposed their adoption.

    <<Do you have these theses written out?>> I asked him.

    <<I have ample notes,>> he replied boldly. <<We were together with Mehmet Shehu at that seminar, we have everything noted down accurately.>>

    <<Very well,>> I said. <<Write out these things you have presented to me, and bring them to me so that we can study them more carefully.>>

    A few days later Themelko brought me the <<theses>>. They were the same ideas and claims which we had heard long ago about the <<specific experience of the Yugoslav army in the National Liberation War>>, about the <<creative application>> of military science by Tito, about the <<importance of this experience in the struggle against the stereotypism of earlier revolutions>>, etc., etc., except that now they were elevated to art, to theory. According to them, <<in the conditions of the Balkans and Europe as a whole, the experience of the October Revolution and the Red Army are no longer of value>>, because <<the new conditions are different from those of the October Revolution>>, and also because <<the Red Army belongs to a country which is thirty years ahead in the construction of socialism.>> Thus, according to Tempo, the forms of organization and functioning of the Red Army were allegedly unsuitable for us!

    After I carefully studied the Yugoslavs' <<theses>> I summoned Themelko and Mehmet Shehu and gave them my clear-cut opinion:

    <<In these theses there are incorrect, mistaken views and we must not adopt them in any way. We do not disdain any good experience,>> I told them, <<but these theses do not contain such a thing. Then, why should we adopt their theses when we have our own and the Soviet experience?>>

    Thus, this effort of the Titoites failed, too.

    From all these stands of ours, as well as from the detailed information which they received from the sources of the secret agency which they had created, the Yugoslavs were convinced that they could not use our army as a blind tool

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to realize their secret aims. So they changed their tactics.

    In July 1947, a big Yugoslav military delegation headed by Vukmanovic-Tempo and Koca Popovic (the former, political director and the latter, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army) came to Albania and held intensive discussions with our representatives, Kristo Themelko, Mehmet Shehu, etc. During those days I was preparing to go to Moscow and when we returned, Mehmet Shehu and Kristo Themelko came to inform me:

    <<The talks gave brilliant results,>> said Mehmet Shehu. <<The Yugoslav comrades take a serious view of the alarming situation in the Balkans and proposed to give us major supplies of military material, all-round aid and mutual collaboration in all sectors of defence.>>

    <<What is meant by this collaboration?>> I asked.

    <<More or less like the collaboration in the other sectors. 'The spirit of the Economic Convention should be extended to the army, too,' Tempo told us. They proposed concrete measures about raising the efficiency of the army, about the extension of military projects, about equipment, communications, clothing, etc. In short, we should have a bigger army, better equipped technically, better clothed, shod and fed. That is, a modern army. We are defining the concrete measures for this major undertaking.>>

    <<All these things are necessary,>> I told Mehmet Shehu, <<but you must bear in mind our conditions. Can our economy cope with all these demands immediately?!>>

    <<You must not worry about this. In the spirit of the Convention, the Yugoslav comrades agreed to cover our expenditure in the army with their budget!>>

    This seemed to me extremely suspect. The <<friends>> who were fulfilling almost nothing of what they had undertaken in the economic sectors were now becoming extremely generous in regard to the army! And when Kristo Themelko considered it <<necessary>> to add to what Mehmet Shehu said, my doubts and worries were further reinforced.

    <<The Yugoslav comrades are going to treat our army the

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same as their army!>> added Shule. <<Tempo said that in the spirit of the Economic Convention, while unifications in the economy are important, the unification of our armies is just as important, if not more so!>>

    <<What? What is this unification of the armies?!>> I asked shocked.

    <<He did not say that, I did not hear it!>> Mehmet Shehu intervened quickly when he saw how shocked I was.

    <<He spoke about the extension of the spirit of the Economic Convention to the army, too,>> Themelko replied quietly. <<We were together in all the talks and we agreed to everything. What is the Economic Convention? The unification of prices, equalization of currencies, customs union. I understand this spirit in the army as unification of armies.>>

    <<Did Tempo say this or is this how you understood it?>> I asked, looking at him sternly.

    <<Perhaps I have confused the matter,>> mumbled Shule.

    <<'Perhaps I have confused the matter', you say,>> I retorted angrily. <<Why don't you rather say that you saw the relations between our armies as those between the lek and the dinar?>>

    Mehmet Shehu <<declared>> once again that this <<has not been said>>. This <<would be a mistake>>, <<Comrade Shule should not make naive comparisons>>, etc.

    This problem was closed, considering it a blunder of Shule. However, immediately after the accusations which Zlatic communicated to us in November, we heard with shock and regret and were finally convinced that what Shule <<had thought>>, but Mehmet Shehu allegedly <<had not heard>>(!) in July, was more than true. The Yugoslavs quite openly demanded the unification of our armies, that is, the placing of our army under the general command of the Yugoslav army.

    During one of those days Mehmet Shehu came to me and said:

    <<Comrade Commander, in the General Staff we are quarrelling because there is talk about the unification of the two commands of our armies and the Yugoslavs want to eliminate you!>>

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    These were the moments after Nako Spiru's suicide, the moments when Koçi Xoxe had drawn his sword and was brandishing it left and right. In the analyses which we were making, amongst other accusations raised were those about the <<unsatisfactory situation in the army>>, especially in the General Staff, about <<the stereotype spirit>> in which we were educating the army (!), about <<the underestimation of the military experience of the Yugoslav comrades,>> etc.

    Initially these attacks were made by <<criticizing>> the chief of the General Staff Mehmet Shehu. Especially in a number of people in the Political Directory of the Army with whom the Yugoslavs were in direct contact, such a feeling was crystallizing, not only against Mehmet Shehu, but also against me. This was still not being done openly, but indirectly that is where it led, because it turned out as if I had proposed Mehmet Shehu as chief of the Staff, and supported him, etc. On the other hand, since I was Commander-in-Chief, now that it was said that <<things are not going well in the General Staff,>> this was a direct attack against me for <<permitting>> this situation!

    Mehmet Shehu, who felt that his position was shaky, to save himself from this situation <<opposed>> the Yugoslavs openly (later I shall relate what this <<opposition>> was), and tried to gain my backing and support. His statement that, <<the Yugoslavs are trying to eliminate you>>, did not surprise me at those moments, because we were at the climax of the analyses in the Bureau, but nevertheless I asked him in what direction he saw this thing.

    <<General Hamovic, Tempo's deputy, has come with a group of militarymen and they are demanding, not only the unification of our armies, but also the creation of a unified command which will direct the activities and training of the unified army,>> explained Mehmet Shehu.

    <<I opposed them openly,>> he added.

    I took a very serious view of the information which Mehmet Shehu gave me, <<informed>> Koçi Xoxe about this, too, and told him we should organize a meeting in which, in the

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presence of Mehmet Shehu and Kristo Themelko, Hamovic should make the ideas of the Yugoslav leadership <<clearer>> to us.

    The meeting was held, but Hamovic did not take part. He had gone to inspect the detachments personally and to make contact with the various chiefs of our army!

    <<Mehmet Shehu has been hasty in the conclusion which he draws and in all the information which he has given you!>> Shule attacked him. <<We were going to inform you about everything they said at the meeting, but the matters have still not matured.>>

    <<What? Do you think that I should be informed when you have decided everything? Such a thing is not permitted in any sector, least of all in the army!>> I told Themelko.

    <<You are right, Comrade Commander, but we are in the phase of discussion. You are occupied with other work and Mehmet Shehu is manoeuvering to confuse us, just as his friend Nako Spiru did. It has not been said that you should be eliminated. You remain Commander-in-Chief.>>

    <<Whether or not I remain, neither you, I, nor Hamovic decides this. The Party, the representative organs of the people in power decide this!>> I said to him.

    <<The placing of our army under the Yugoslav command leads you to my conclusion,>> put in Mehmet Shehu.

    <<Who said that the command would be Yugoslav?>> exploded Koçi Xoxe. <<It will be a joint, unified command.>>

    <<You, too, have been informed about this?! How is it that you did not inform me?>> I asked Xoxe immediately.

    He was nonplussed for a moment but now he had become a master of escaping from <<check-mate>>.

    <<No! After you spoke to me yesterday I was worried and asked Shule. He made things clear to me.>>

    It was plain that he was lying, but now lies and deception were becoming a system and it was in vain to try to discover the roots of them.

    <<They are only some ideas, Comrade Commander, which apply not only to us, but also to the Bulgarian army.>> The-

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melko tried to calm the atmosphere. <<We shall present the platform of unification to you when the idea is properly worked out. Mehmet Shehu is trying to split us with the aim of covering up his own mistakes. Since he became chief of the General Staff he has done nothing but damage. There is no harmony between the General Staff and the Political Directory. Mehmet Shehu wants to do everything himself, elbows other comrades out and offends people over nothing. Now he tells you that allegedly 'you are being eliminated', but when we were in Belgrade he himself eliminated you.>>

    <<Kristo Themelko be careful about what you say!>> shouted Mehmet Shehu angrily. <<You are lying to the Commander for evil aims!>>

    <<Do you remember what you said to Comrade Tito when we met him in Belgrade?>> replied Shule, quite unperturbed. <<'Under the leadership and supreme command of Comrade Tito our armies will become invincible'! That is what you said!>>

    Mehmet Shehu's face turned red and he did not know what to say. Then he muttered:

    <<That was a toast! Exaggerated things are said in toasts. And I proposed a toast to Comrade Enver, too. . .>>

    <<Don't talk to us about toasts here,>> interrupted Koçi Xoxe. <<And you, Mehmet Shehu, pull yourself together. With these things that you are saying you will further alienate us from friendly Yugoslavia! When you go to Belgrade you butter up Tito, here you do the same thing with the Commander. You are dishonest with both of them. I know you very well, I know you inside out, just as I knew Nako Spiru.>>

    Mehmet Shehu turned pale and seemed frozen to the spot.

    <<We are going to look into your work carefully,>> continued Koçi, <<because the Plenum is coming up. We shall settle all these things at the Plenum.>>

    A few days later, at a joint meeting of the General Staff and the Political Directory of the Army, Mehmet Shehu was faced with the full attack. There were plenty of grounds

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on which to catch him in mistakes, all of them were gathered up against him, they were labelled as <<anti-Yugoslavism>> and the proposal to discharge him from the function he held was presented to the Political Bureau! In the existing situation the opinion of the Bureau in this case, too, was to be just a matter of form. Everything had been predetermined outside the Bureau. At the end of December 1947 Mehmet Shehu was replaced by Beqir Balluku.

    It was quite obvious that things were on the decline in the army, as in all other sectors. I was fully convinced that the question of <<unification>> and the <<unified command>> was not an <<idea in the process of elaboration,>> as Koçi Xoxe and Kristo Themelko tried to present it, but a clear-cut demand. At that period, Kristo Themelko and the new chief of the General Staff Beqir Balluku were summoned to Belgrade allegedly for <<preliminary discussion and consultation>>, but it seemed to me that all this was a manoeuvre which was fraught with other dangers. I felt that it was absolutely necessary to have a quiet consultation with our comrades, but Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo did not agree that we should engage ourselves on a <<project>> when we had more <<important[>> (?) -- DJR] things in front of us -- <<the deepening of the analyses for the Plenum>>! I wanted to consult the Soviet comrades, too, but Koçi Xoxe leapt up in the air as if he were stung by a wasp:

    <<Consult the Soviets?!>> he cried. <<In no way! We are not clear yet and we will confuse the VKP! Let us wait to hear what the comrades have to tell us when they return from Belgrade, and then see what to do!>>

    Eventually the comrades returned. Only this time they were neither alone nor empty-handed. With them came a Yugoslav general with a resounding name, which when you heard it, created the impression that hob-nailed boots were marching <<crunch-crunch>> on the cobblestones. This was General Kupresanin. He had brought a whole suite of colonels and majors and an <<extremely urgent and important>> message for me from Tito personally.

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    As far as I remember, I received them the day following their arrival in Tirana. We exchanged the usual greetings and the General started directly into his theme:

    <<On the special order of our supreme commander, the Minister of People's Defence, Marshal of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, I have come to you to bring a series of proposals of exceptional importance. What I have to communicate to you, as well as information about my identity, is communicated officially and in detail in this personal letter from Comrade Tito. Allow me to hand it to you!>>

    He rose to his feet, stood to attention, took one step forward and held out the envelope to me, all solemnity, as if he were presenting his letter of credentials.

    <<Now allow me to communicate to you orally the purpose of my dispatch here so unexpectedly. The situation around us presents greater threats than ever. We have information that in Greece the preparations are being completed for an attack which will be aimed initially against your southeastern borders.>>

    He was silent for a moment, and then said to the Yugoslav officer whom he had with him:

    <<The map!>>

    Immediately a big map of the Balkans on which arrows, circles, flags and all kinds of other multi-coloured lines struck the eye was unrolled.

    <<It is envisaged that the attack will begin in this territory,>> said Kupresanin, pointing to the border in the Korça-Erseka zone. <<We have information also that simultaneous attacks may begin from the sea. The Greek aggressive forces, supported by the Anglo-American forces and means, will try to smash your defence with a rapid general assault and then penetrate in depth. . . In these conditions, our leadership, extremely worried and loyal to its obligations under the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid, considers that a series of urgent measures should be taken. In regard to the main one, I shall cite textually what Comrade Tito writes to you in the letter I handed to you,>> said Kupresanin. He opened his brief-

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