Charles
Bettelheim
Class
Struggles
in the
USSR
Second Period: 1923-1930
[Section 7 -- Part 4,
Sec. 3 and Part 5]
.GIF)
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Charles Bettelheim Class
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© 1978 by Monthly Review Press
Translated by Brian Pearce
Originally published as
Les Luttes de classes en URSS
© 1977 by Maspero/Seuil, Paris, France
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Contents | |||
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3. |
The Bolshevik ideological formation and |
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page 7
Key to abbreviations, initials, and Russian
words used in the text
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Artel |
A particular form of producers' cooperative |
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Cadet party |
The Constitutional Democratic Party |
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CLD |
See STO |
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Cheka |
Extraordinary Commission (political police) |
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Glavk |
One of the chief directorates in the Supreme Council of the National Economy or in a people's commissariat |
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Gosplan |
State Planning Commission |
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GPU |
State Political Administration (political police) |
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Kulak |
A rich peasant, often involved in capitalist activities of one kind or another, such as hiring out agricultural machinery, trade, moneylending, etc. |
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Mir |
The village community |
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Narkomtrud |
People's Commissariat of Labor |
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NEP |
New Economic Policy |
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NKhSSSRv |
National Economy of the USSR in (a certain year or period) |
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NKVD |
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs |
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OGPU |
Unified State Political Administration (political police) |
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Orgburo |
Organization Bureau of the Bolshevik Party |
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Politburo |
Political Bureau of the Bolshevik Party |
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Rabfak |
Workers' Faculty |
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Rabkrin |
See RKI |
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RCP(B) |
Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik): official |
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name of the Bolshevik Party, adopted by the Seventh Party Congress in March 1918 |
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RKI |
Workers' and Peasants' Inspection |
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RSDLP |
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party |
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RSDLP(B) |
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolshevik) |
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RSFSR |
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic |
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Skhod |
General assembly of a village |
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Sovkhoz |
State farm |
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Sovnarkhoz |
Regional Economic Council |
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Sovnarkom |
Council of People's Commissars |
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SR |
Socialist Revolutionary |
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STO |
Council of Labor and Defense |
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Uchraspred |
Department in the Bolshevik Party responsible for registering the members and assigning them to different tasks |
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Uyezd |
County |
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Volost |
Rural district |
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VSNKh |
Supreme Economic Council |
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VTsIK |
All-Russia Central Executive Committee (organ derived from the Congress of soviets) |
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Zemstvo |
Administrative body in country areas before the Revolution |
page 500
The dominant role played in deciding the outcome of the class struggles by the Bolshevik Party's interventions in the political, economic, and social life of the Soviet formation was due to the integration of the Party in these struggles and to the place it occupied in the system of government -- to its role, in fact, as the ruling Party. This means that the Party's interventions helped to impose a certain course of development upon most of the struggles, but not necessarily that this course was the one that the Party intended. The degree to which the course and outcome of these struggles coincided with the Party's aims depended on the adequacy to the real situation of the analysis, or the conception, of this situation on the basis of which the Party acted, and, above all, on the social forces that the Party was able to rally round its policy and to mobilize.
Basically, the nature and the forms of the Party's interventions were dominated by the system of ideas which, at any given moment, constituted, with their distinctive articulation, the Bolshevik ideological formation. This did not come from nowhere, but was the historical product of the class struggles and of the lessons (true or false) drawn from them, and of the political relations existing within the Party and between the Party and the various classes of society.
The Bolshevik ideological formation was not something laid down "once for all time." It was a complex social reality, objective and subject to change. It was realized in practices and forms of organization, as well as in the formulations embodied in a set of documents. This reality had definite effects upon those whom it served as an instrument for analyzing and interpreting the world, and also for changing the world. These effects differed in accordance with the internal con-
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tradictions of the ideological formation, the diversity of the places occupied in the social formation by those to whom Bolshevism served as a guide, and the different social practices in which these persons were engaged.
Marxism-Leninism was the theoretical basis of Bolshevism, but cannot be identified with the Bolshevik ideological formation. That was a contradictory reality within which a constant struggle went on between revolutionary Marxist thinking, Marxism as constituted historically, and various ideological currents which were alien to Marxism -- parodying it, because they often borrowed its "terminology."
The distinctions thus made call for some clarification. They imply that the Bolshevik ideological formation cannot, as a whole, be treated as equivalent to Marxism-Leninism. They imply also that revolutionary Marxist thinking cannot be treated as equivalent, at all times, to Marxism as it was historically constituted in each epoch, on the basis of fusion between revolutionary Marxist thinking and the organized movement of the vanguard of the proletariat. Marxism constituted in that way signified a systematized set of ideas and practices which enabled the revolutionary working-class movement claiming to be Marxist to deal, in the concrete conditions in which it found itself, with the problems which it had to confront. These successive systematizations -- necessary for action, but including elements that were more or less improvised and corresponding to the demands, real or apparent, of a given conjuncture of the class struggle -- were the Marxism of each epoch: that of German Social Democracy, that of the Second International at the end of the nineteenth century, and, in the early twentieth century, that of the Third International, and so on.
At the core of Marxism as historically constituted, a variable place was given to revolutionary principles and conceptions resulting from scientific analysis carried out from the standpoint of the proletariat's class positions and based on the lessons drawn from the proletariat's own struggles. The outcome of this analysis and of these lessons is the scientific nucleus of Marxism. Marxist scientific thought was not
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"brought from outside" into the working class. It was a scientific systematization of that class's own struggles and initiatives. It resulted from a process of elaboration which started from the masses and returned to the masses, and which involved a conceptual systematization.
Marxist scientific thought is not "given" once and for all: it has to be developed, enriched, and rectified on the basis of new struggles and new initiatives. Substantial rectifications are inevitable, for Marxist scientific thought, which can be called revolutionary Marxism, has to learn from the struggles waged by the working masses as they advance along a road never previously explored.
Revolutionary Marxism is not a system, but it does include elements of the systematic, thanks to which, in the contradictory reality which it constitutes, the scientific knowledge that is its nucleus plays the dominant role, enabling it to grasp objective reality and to act upon this with full awareness of what is involved.
The very development of revolutionary Marxism implies the existence of contradictions within it[1] and the transformation of these contradictions through a process which makes it possible for scientific knowledge to be corrected and completed as regards the element of objectivity which it grasps. Hence Lenin's formulation: "We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and inviolable: on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation-stone of the science which socialists must develop in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life."[2]
Like every other science, therefore, revolutionary Marxism undergoes a process of development. At every stage of this process some of the theoretical formulations or ideological conceptions[3] which formed part of the revolutionary Marxism of the previous epoch are eliminated; they are thenceforth alien to it, which does not mean that they are necessarily eliminated at once and "definitively," either from Marxism as it is constituted historically in the revolutionary working-class involvement, or, still less, from the various ideological currents which, though alien to Marxism, play a role in the revolutionary movement.
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The process of transforming revolutionary Marxism and the process of transforming Marxism as historically constituted in each epoch are not "parallel" processes. The former is the development of a science, whereas the latter is the transformation of an ideology which has a scientific basis. Under the impact of the difficulties experienced by the struggles of the working class, Marxism as historically constituted in each epoch experiences not only theoretical enrichment (connected with the development of scientific knowledge, itself due to social practice) but also impoverishment, through the fading, obscuring, or covering-up, to a greater or less degree, of some of the principles or ideas of revolutionary Marxism.[4]
All this helps to make a necessary distinction, and illustrates the meaning of a phrase of Marx's which was no mere witticism: "All I know is that I am not a Marxist."[5] By this he meant that he refused to identify his work with the Marxism of the German Social Democrats, or of some other "Marxisms" -- as we see from his reaction to the way his ideas were interpreted by some Russian writers. This refusal meant rejecting the reduction of his scientific discoveries to an ideological system such as that which German Social Democracy constructed in its necessary fight against Lassallism, and also in its compromise with the latter. This system doubtless corresponded to some of the needs of the German labor movement of the time, and was the starting point for successive changes (from which, in particular, the Marxism of the Third International emerged); but it excluded part of the heritage of revolutionary Marxism[6] (and sometimes "utilized" passages from Marx which did not correspond to the more mature forms of his work). The Marxism of German Social Democracy tended to "overlook"[7] some of the analyses made by Marx after the Paris Commune, regarding the forms of political authority, the state, the organizations of the working class, the forms of property and appropriation, etc.[8]
We have seen the struggle waged by Lenin to transform the Marxism of his epoch, in order to develop it and to bring back into it a number of fundamental theses of revolutionary Marxism (especially on the problem of the state), so as to combat "economism." We have seen, too, the obstacles and resis-
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tances that this struggle encountered even inside the Bolshevik Party.[9]
The presence in the Bolshevik ideological formation of currents alien to Marxism[10] was a necessary consequence of the class struggle. At different times, these currents had a more or less considerable influence on Bolshevism. One of the characteristic features of Lenin's activity was his striving to expose the theoretical roots of the conceptions which he fought against. He applied this method also to the mistakes which he himself made and acknowledged: not restricting himself to a correction or to a self-criticism, he undertook an analysis. This was an essential feature of Lenin's practice, and one that tended to disappear from subsequent Bolshevik practice, which preferred usually to carry out "silent rectifications" that did not contribute to a genuine development of Marxism and left intact the possibility of falling into the same errors again.[11]
However, the currents in Bolshevism that were alien to Marxism did not necessarily disappear just because they had been criticized. Insofar as the social foundations on which they were based continued to exist, they themselves survived, though, as a rule, in modified forms.
The history of the Bolshevik ideological formation appears as a history of the transformation of various currents which composed the contradictory unity of Bolshevism, and of the relations of domination and subordination between them.
This was no "history of ideas," but the history of the effects upon the Bolshevik ideological formation of the changes in class relations and class struggles, and in the way that the Party was involved in these struggles. It included periods when the influence of revolutionary Marxism grew and periods when its influence declined. We cannot trace that history here: it would require a number of analyses which are still to be undertaken. But it is necessary to mention some of the characteristics of the process of transformation of the Bolshevik ideological formation, and to point out that when the influence of currents alien to Marxism grew stronger within it, the capacity of Marxism to develop was reduced, and it tended to "congeal," with ready-made formulas replacing those con-
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crete analyses which are, in Lenin's words, "the soul of Marxism."
The transformations undergone by the Bolshevik ideological formation were due either to the development of new knowledge or to the inhibition of old knowledge. These transformations had as their internal cause the contradictions within the Bolshevik formation itself, but their actual movement was dictated by the class struggles that went on in the Soviet social formation, and by the impact that these struggles had on social relations and practices, especially on the conditions for mass social experiment. The changes undergone by the Bolshevik ideological formation produced, owing to the position held by the Bolshevik Party in the system of ideological apparatuses, reactions which affected the Soviet formation itself, by way of the Party's interventions.
Let it be noted here that in the concrete history of the Bolshevik ideological formation there took place a gradual inhibition of certain concepts which made it possible to analyze the movement of reproduction of commodity and capitalist relations, the existence of which is manifested through the forms "value," "price," "wages," and "profit." Gradually, these forms came to be treated more and more as "empty forms," "integuments," which were used for "practical" (or "technical") purposes (accounting in money terms, "efficiency" of management, etc.); whereas awareness of the social relations which they manifest (and conceal) was inhibited in the Bolshevik ideological formation. This inhibition corresponded to the increasing dominance of the ideological notions of bourgeois political economy: it was still possible to consider the problem of the quantity of value, but no longer to ask why such forms still existed. Here let us recall an observation of Marx's: "Political economy . . . has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form. . . ."[12]
Yet it is only by asking such a question that one can go beyond empirical knowledge, covering the apparent relation between forms (reality as it seems to itself [sich darstellt ]), to real scientific knowledge, knowledge of the real movement.
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Empirical knowledge can orient action in a general way, but only scientific knowledge can give it precise guidance, enabling it actually to achieve its aim, because such knowledge makes possible analysis, foresight, and action with full awareness of what is involved.
The inhibition, during certain periods, of some of the scientific knowledge making up revolutionary Marxism was a result of the class struggle, which engendered a variety of ideological currents. What happened toward the end of the NEP had decisive political significance: it reduced the Bolshevik Party's capacity to analyze, to foresee, and to act in full awareness of what was involved.
Another observation needs to be made. The internal contradictions of Bolshevism, the struggles fought out within it between Marxism-Leninism and various other ideological trends, were not directly due to the different "tendencies" whose conflicts mark the history of the Bolshevik Party. These "tendencies" were themselves contradictory combinations of ideological currents that were present in the Bolshevik ideological formation.
The internal contradictions of Bolshevism made themselves felt in the ideology of the Party majority as well as in that of the various oppositions. The latter were differentiated by their particular ways of combining the ideas of revolutionary Marxism with ideas that were alien to it. As time went by, these combinations underwent variations that also affected the ideology of the Party majority, which was by no means always identical. Furthermore, the changes this ideology underwent did not correspond simply to a deepening of revolutionary Marxism or an extension of its influence within the Bolshevik ideological formation (as is suggested by the idea of a "linear development" which takes no account of the class struggle and its ideological effects). They corresponded also to the setbacks which restored life and prestige (in barely modified forms) to ideological configurations which had previously been recognized as being strongly marked by ideas alien to revolutionary Marxism. This was the case toward the end of the NEP, when the Party majority rallied round the idea of "maximum development of the production of means of pro-
page 507
duction,"[13] to be accomplished through maximum accumulation obtained chiefly by exacting "tribute" from the peasantry.[14]
These same ideas had earlier been promoted by Preobrazhensky and the Trotskyist opposition, and had been correctly condemned in the name of defense of the worker-peasant alliance.[15]
If we look at the principal documents approved at various times by the leading organs of the Bolshevik Party, together with the speeches, books, and articles of most of its leaders, we can see that the Bolshevik ideological formation was indeed a battlefield where revolutionary Marxism was constantly in combat with ideas that were alien to it.
During the first half of the 1920s, the principal formulations issued by the Party leaders, and embodied in the resolutions adopted at that time, either reaffirmed the essential theses of revolutionary Marxism or else constituted a certain deepening of basic Marxist positions. This was so as regards the demands of the worker-peasant alliance, the role to be assigned to the organizing of the masses in many different ways, the need to tackle the problems of building socialism, the indispensability of developing soviet democracy. During those years, the dominance of the ideas of revolutionary Marxism tended, on the whole, to grow stronger. However, as we have seen, a number of positions of principle or decisions taken failed to exercise any broad and lasting influence on the practices of the state machine and the Party. This was often the case with regard to democratic centralism, soviet democracy, economic and political relations with the peasant masses, and relations between the Russian Republic and the other Soviet republics.[16]
After 1925-1926, various changes affected the Bolshevik ideological formation, contributing to the reinforcement of ideological elements that were alien to revolutionary Marxism. The party then launched into an industrial policy which aggravated the contradictions within the state industrial sector, and engaged in practices detrimental to the firmness of the worker-peasant alliance. At the same time, it became blinder to the negative effects of these practices, which seemed to it to
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have been dictated as "necessities" inherent in the building of socialism.
In order to make the foregoing more explicit we must survey some of the elements alien to revolutionary Marxism which were present in the Bolshevik ideological formation, and show the place that these elements occupied at different moments, together with some of their political consequences.
I am not going to undertake here a systematic examination of the elements alien to revolutionary Marxism which were at work within the Bolshevik ideological formation, or to analyze the historical conditions responsible for their appearance and development. This would form the subject of a specific study which remains to be made. The following remarks are intended mainly to show the presence of certain elements which played an important part in the ideological struggles and the political interventions, and, in certain cases, to indicate some of the conditions in which they appeared. The limited purpose of these remarks means that the order in which they are set out is not intended to reveal the existence of some "central" ideological theme that may have played a dominant role in relation to the elements alien to revolutionary Marxism. The order in which the questions are examined is merely that which seems easiest -- starting with themes that are relatively well known and going on to deal with others that are less well known.
For revolutionary Marxism, the class struggle is the driving force of history, and so history, as long as classes exist, is the
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history of class struggle.[18] This struggle leads necessarily to the dictatorship of the proletariat, itself a transition to the abolition of all classes, to a classless society.[19] Class struggles, like classes themselves, have as their material basis the forms and modes of production in which producers and nonproducers are integrated. They transform the conditions of production, cause new productive forces to emerge, break up old production relations, and engender new relations. Knowledge of the inner laws of the process of transformation of the production relations is not a necessary constituent factor in this process. The latter usually presents itself to the mind in ideological forms -- legal, political, religious, artistic, philosophical -- which result from the contradictions of material life. It is through these ideological forms that the struggles are usually fought out, and not necessarily on the basis of knowledge of real relations[20] which result from a materialist analysis of the movement of history. Characteristic of Bolshevism was its principled application of such an analysis. Nevertheless, in some Bolshevik documents, the interlinking of the different factors entering into the analysis (classes, production relations, productive forces) was not what was proper to revolutionary Marxism. We must pause to consider this question.[21]
A good illustration of what has just been said is to be found in Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism. [22] Although it is later in date than the period being studied in this book, I shall refer to it here because it is the most systematic exposition of what gradually became, after the late 1920s, the dominant conception in the Bolshevik Party.[23]
I shall start by indicating how those theses of Dialectical and Historical Materialism to which attention will chiefly be paid are situated in the general structure of this work. The first part of it, about which I shall say only a little, is devoted to expounding dialectical materialism.[24] Here we find recalled certain propositions of Lenin's regarding the role of internal
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contradictions in the development of things. References to "struggle of opposite tendencies" and to "the class struggle of the proletariat" illustrate these propositions. Two points call for emphasis:
a. In the second part of the work, devoted to historical materialism,[25] the class struggle as driving force of history barely gets mentioned.
b. The first part contains an explicit critique of Bogdanov's "fideism,"[26] whose incompatibility with Marxism is very briefly mentioned,[27] but in the second part we find no criticism of Bogdanov's "sociological" conceptions[28] (which were continued by Proletkult [29]). This deficiency is not unconnected with the actual content of the second part of the work, which we shall now examine.
The fundamental thesis propounded in the second part of Dialectical and Historical Materialism is that "the determining force of social development" is constituted by "the concrete conditions of the material life of society." This thesis is complemented by another statement -- that "the party of the proletariat must not base its activity on abstract 'principles of human reason,' but on the concrete conditions of the material life of society, as the determining force of social development: not on the good wishes of 'great men' but on the real needs of development of the material life of society."[30]
These propositions are presented as being in conformity with those formulated by Marx in his 1859 preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.[31] Actually, they include a number of specific features which give them a different meaning from that of Marx's revolutionary theses. To be observed, in particular, are:
a. The use of the formulas "social development" or "development of society," thus presenting "society" as an entity developing historically. They take the place held in the 1859 preface by the expression, "process of social, political and intellectual life,"[32] which emphasizes the conception of a social process and does not mention "society" either as "subject" or "object."
b. The use of the expression "concrete conditions of the
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material life of society," a vague notion to which Stalin's essay endeavors later on to give a more precise content (as we shall see).
c. The introduction of the notion of "real needs of development of the material life of society." This implies that there are "needs of society," not at the level of the reproduction of the production relations (where this notion is used by Marx, when he speaks of "social needs") but at that of some "development of society" on which "the party of the proletariat must base its activity."
This notion of "needs of development" is substituted for the objective contradictions and class conflicts, and also for the needs of the masses, on which the party of the proletariat must, in fact, base itself so as to ensure, not the "development of society" but the revolutionary transformation of the production relations.
Thus, the formulations present in this part of the essay replace the concepts of revolutionary Marxism with different ones, derived (in spite of apparent "similarities") from a different conception of the movement of history. In this conception, the dominant figure is the "concrete conditions of the material life of society," while knowledge of the "needs of development" replaces analysis of class struggles and contradictions.
As Stalin proceeds, he makes clear the significance of this dominant figure -- all the more dominant because it is said to be the "determining force of social development."
Among the "conditions of the material life of society" Stalin mentions, first of all, nature which surrounds society, geographical environment.[33] However, he declines to see this "environment" as "the chief force determining the physiognomy of society" because "the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and development of geographical environment."[34] After mentioning also "growth of population" as being among the "conditions of material life of society", and after rejecting the idea that it can be "the determining force of social development," Stalin says: "This force, historical materialism
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holds, is the method of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence, the mode of production of material values. . . .[35]
In this formulation, as can be seen from the whole passage, a "technicist" element predominates. It makes the mode of production (and not the contradictions in it ) the principal force of "social development." The mode of production is not conceived as the contradictory unity of the relations of production and the productive forces, but as an organized sum of elements or aspects which the passage enumerates. One of these aspects is constituted by the "productive forces" (themselves made up of the following "elements": the instruments of production, the people who operate them thanks to a certain "production experience" and "labour-skill"). The other "aspect" is the "relations of production."[36]
This enumeration, which mentions neither classes nor social contradictions, throws no light on what is the "chief force" of "the development of society." The latter is, first, simply affirmed, and then identified with the development of production, of which it is said that it "never stays at one point for a long time."[37] In its turn, this "development" is identified with the "development of the productive forces," which thus appears as the deus ex machina, the source of all "development of society": for it is said that the latter always depends on the development of the productive forces which itself depends primarily on the instruments of production.[38]
At this point we find ourselves faced with formulations differing radically from those of revolutionary Marxism, for which the historical process is determined, in the last analysis by class contradictions. The material basis of these is not mere change in the instruments of production but the contradictions in the economic basis (the contradictory unity of the production relations and the productive forces), and they develop by way of the ideological forms which these contradictions themselves engender. Revolutionary Marxism does not ascribe the development of the productive forces to a spontaneous process, or to "contradictions" external to the mode of production, counterposing "society" to "nature."
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However, according to the conception developed in Dialectical and Historical Materialism, it is the instruments of production, and the changes which these undergo as a result of the ceaseless development of production, that determine changes in society.[39] Social classes and their struggles do not play the role of driving force here -- indeed, in this part of Stalin's work they do not figure at all.[40] As for production relations, they appear to lead, somehow, an existence which is external to the productive forces: they merely "influence" the development of these forces "accelerating or retarding" it, but this development must, "sooner or later," lead to the transformation of these relations, so that they eventually "come in to correspondence with . . . the level of development of the productive forces" -- otherwise there occurs "a crisis of production, a destruction of productive forces."[41]
This outline of the conception of "social development" which is given in Dialectical and Historical Materialism has been necessary for more than one reason. First, because the systematic form of this work makes it possible to consider what relation the ideas contained in it bear to Marx's analyses. Secondly, because this work poses the problem of the objective basis for the increasing predominance of the conceptions which it contains.
The remarks which follow are an attempt to answer these two questions. They concern also some other contradictory aspects of the Bolshevik ideological formation, which will be dealt with later.
The formulations of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, summarized and discussed in the foregoing pages undoubtedly bear some relationship to certain writings by Marx. This gives them a sort of "Marxist authenticity," the narrow limits of which need to be recognized, however, if we do not wish to
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fall into a "talmudistic" notion of Marxism which tends to reduce it to a commentary on, or a rearrangement of, quotations isolated from their context. We need to distinguish in the writings of Marx and Engels between what was radically new, contributing vitally to the formation of revolutionary Marxism, and what was merely repetition of old ideas, or provisional points of transition toward revolutionary positions and analyses.[42] Concretely, as regards the relations between social changes (and more especially changes in production relations) and changes in the material conditions of production, we find in the works of Marx and Engels two major categories of formulation.
The earlier category affirms essentially a materialist view of history, stressing that history is not the outcome of men's ideas but of the conditions of production. This is, very broadly, the position of Marx in his youthful writings, particularly The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy, which date from 1846 and 1847, respectively.[43] This same position is set forth strikingly in a letter addressed by Marx on December 28, 1846, to one of his Russian correspondents, Pavel Annenkov, who had emigrated to France. In this letter Marx says:
Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption, and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organization of the family, of orders or of classes, in a word, a corresponding civil society, and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society.[44]
Taken by itself, this formulation makes the totality of social relations and practices the "expression" of the "productive forces." "Society" is here presented as an "expressive totality," which is not contradictory, and the changes in which seem to depend upon "development in production." The central role played by the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the process of social change does not appear here, whereas it is stressed by Marx in those of his writings which develop a
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revolutionary and dialectical materialist position. The content of these writings is incompatible with a conception of "society" forming an "expressive totality," for they show that the driving force of history is the movement of internal contradictions and the class struggles. These formulations are set forth in a particularly striking way in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, but they are not absent from earlier writings, including the letter to Annenkov which I have just quoted.
Only gradually do formulations consistently expressing materialist and revolutionary positions become dominant in Marx's writings. And even when this has happened, the earlier type of formulation re-surfaces (which should not surprise us), at least in modified forms. This is what we see, for instance, in the case of the 1859 preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. This preface presents a dialectic of contradiction between productive forces and production relations which leaves the reader to assume the existence of a "development" of the productive forces that is autonomous, so to speak, with its movement partly unexplained. It nevertheless remains true that, in this work, the transformation of social relations is not related directly to the "development of the productive forces," but to the contradictions which this development entails, and to the ideological forms in which "men become conscious" of the contradictions and fight out their conflicts.[45]
In volume I of Capital, however, some formulations very close to those of 1846 are still present. Certain ones even sometimes accentuate the importance attributed to technology. Thus, Marx writes: "Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from these relations."[46]
In such passages, social relations and their changes are apparently ascribed to technology, while the social conditions governing the changes in technology are passed over in silence.
The writings which break away from the difficulties bound
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up with the juxtaposition of two types of formulation are those in which Marx ascribes the movement of history, and so, also, the development of the productive forces and even of "technology" to the changing of social relations and the struggles between classes. These formulations go much further than those quoted already: they are at the heart of revolutionary Marxism.
On this point I shall confine myself to two examples, taken from writings of 1865 and concerned with the development of capitalist relations. Dealing with this question, Marx shows that capitalist relations do not result from a "technological change" but from class struggle -- in this case, bourgeois class struggle. This change corresponds to what Marx calls "the formal subsumption of labour under capital," which involves constraint to perform surplus labor. Marx points out that when capital begins to subordinate wage labor and in this way develops new social relations, it does so on the basis of the existing technology. As he says, "technologically speaking [Marx's emphasis -- C. B.] the labour-process goes on as before": what is new is "that it is now subordinated to capital."[47]
It is precisely on the basis of these new (or modified) relations that new productive forces develop, namely, those that correspond to the development of machine production. Marx writes: "On the basis of that change, . . . specific changes in the mode of production are introduced which create new forces of production, and these in turn influence the mode of production so that new real conditions come into being."[48]
Here we see a real dialectical movement, in which what changes first is not the "productive forces," or the "instruments of production," but social relations, and this as the result of class struggle, of bourgeois class struggle. We are therefore very far away from the affirmation made in Dialectical and Historical Materialism that changes in production "always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. "[49]
It is one of the distinctive features of revolutionary Marxism that it reckons with the possibility and necessity of first of all
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changing production relations, in order to ensure, under certain conditions, the development of the productive forces. It was toward the end of the 1920s that this feature of revolutionary Marxism tended to become inhibited from the Bolshevik ideological formation, in favor of a mechanical materialist position, which emphasized in a one-sided way the changing of the instruments of production.[50]
We need to ask the question: what happened toward the end of the 1920s which accounts for the tendency for mechanical materialist conceptions to become predominant in the Bolshevik ideological formation? Or, to go further, what was the objective, social basis of this tendency?
Briefly, we can say that this basis was provided by the nature of the relations that developed between the Bolshevik Party and the masses. Toward the end of the 1920s these had become essentially relations of exteriority. This is clear where the peasant masses were concerned (and they formed by far the majority of the population), since the Party was almost completely absent from the rural areas. But it is true also, even though to a lesser degree, where a large part of the working class was concerned, for a high proportion of the most politicized elements of that class, once they had joined the Party, were very quickly absorbed into the various apparatuses, so that they left the working class.
During the 1920s, the Party struggled to prevent this state of affairs from becoming established, but the successes achieved were very limited.
The nature of the relations between the Bolshevik Party and the masses was due, in the first place, to the conditions which existed at the beginning of our period, at the start of the NEP; to the chaos and disorganization that prevailed at that time; to
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the massive predominance in the machinery of state of elements alien to the working class, over whom the Party exercised only formal control; and to the split that had occurred between the Soviet power and the majority of the peasantry at the end of "war communism"; etc.[51]
Subsequently, lack of experience, and the weight of the ideological elements alien to revolutionary Marxism which were present in the Bolshevik ideological formation, prevented decisive successes being achieved in the development of firm relations of interiority between the Party and the masses.
As a result, the Bolshevik Party was able to render only limited aid to the struggle of the masses for a revolutionary transformation of social relations, the struggle which alone could open the way to a socialist development of the productive forces.
This struggle did exist, being carried on by the most advanced elements of the masses in town and country, but, through not being sufficiently united and supported by the Bolshevik Party, it did not lead to revolutionary changes. The Party's lack of attention to and adequate support for the struggles of the poor and middle peasants had particularly serious consequences in this connection. The same applies to the Party's inability to help the production conferences to result in a revolutionizing of the production relations.[52]
Toward the end of the NEP period it was thus difficult to secure a further increase in production through a mass struggle bringing about a change in production relations. Under these conditions, increased production seemed to depend above all upon a rapid "modernization" of technology, realized by means of massive investment, the resources for which would be mobilized by state action, and it was from this "modernization" that the transformation of social relations was expected to follow. The stress laid upon the role of technology corresponded, at the same time, to the growing weight in society of the technicians and cadres, separated from the masses -- especially the heads of the big enterprises and of the state's central economic organs.
The situation which developed in this way constituted the
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objective basis for the strengthening, within the Bolshevik ideological formation, of elements alien to revolutionary Marxism. This strengthening not only contributed to decisive importance being accorded to technology and technicians, and to state centralization, but also had the result that Bolshevism reformulated the relations between ideological and technological changes.
One of the tasks that the Bolshevik Party strove to carry out was to ensure that the masses mastered revolutionary ideas, which presupposed rejection by the workers and peasants of the old ideas -- religion, superstitions, acceptance of hierarchical relations, etc. However, the way that this task was undertaken by the Party shows that, within the Bolshevik ideological formation, there were increasingly dominant, toward the end of the 1920s, mechanical materialist conceptions which trusted above all in changes in the conditions of production to bring about a "change in ideas," or, as it is sometimes put, a "change of mentality."
An especially significant example of this mechanistic conception is provided by the way the problem of the penetration of socialist ideas among the peasantry was treated. Stalin discussed this problem in his speech "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.," on December 27, 1929, when the policy of mass collectivization was being put into effect.
In this speech, Stalin said:
A great deal of work has still to be done to remould the peasant collective farmer, to set right his individualistic mentality and to transform him into a real working member of a socialist society. And the more rapidly the collective farms are provided with machines, the more rapidly will this be achieved. . . . The great importance of the collective farms lies precisely in that they represent the principal base for the employment of machinery and tractors in agriculture, that they constitute the principal base for remoulding the peasant, for changing his mentality in the spirit of socialism.[53]
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This formulation shows that the transition to collectivization was not regarded as having to result from a process of struggle which, through self-education of the peasant masses, would ensure the development of the ideas of socialism among them. On the contrary, it was the use of machinery and tractors that was to be the means to "set right" the "individualistic mentality" of the peasants. Similarly, the "great importance of the collective farms" was not that they would entail a change in production relations but that they were "the principal base for the employment of machinery and tractors."
According to this conception, therefore, it was not the peasants who were to transform themselves through class struggles and the lessons they drew from their experience, with the Party's help, but the peasants who were to be transformed because they were to be acted upon by means of technology.[54]
In presenting the problem of the ideological transformation of the peasantry in terms not of class struggle but of preliminary material changes,[55] Stalin was not defending a merely "personal" position. This position was then the one held by almost the entire Party. And it was a position that related not to the peasantry only, but also to the working class. The Party looked forward, as a result of the numerical growth of the working class, its integration in modern technology, and the development of the towns (that is, as a result of a certain number of material changes), to a transformation of the "ideas" of a working class which was of immediately peasant origin. Hence, for example, a resolution of the plenum of April 1928, which considered as essential for the building of socialism "the rapid growth of large-scale industry on the basis of modern technology . . . , the growth of the towns and industrial centres, the growth, in quantity and quality alike, of the working class."[56]
The nature of the mechanical link thus alleged to exist between ideological changes and technological changes (including those affecting habitat) may be seen as a "particular case" of the thesis which sees in the "development of the productive forces" the driving force of the "development of society." However, this is not entirely correct, for what is involved here is not so much the ideological superstructure
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corresponding to a certain mode of production as the "psychology," the "mentality," of the workers and peasants, and the "action" upon this of the environment, and, above all, of the instruments of production and the technological characteristics of the labor process. Here we are dealing with positions which are remote from revolutionary Marxism, and which lead to the posing of "psychological" problems while a decisive role is accorded not to class struggles but to the technological conditions of the labor-process.[57]
The effects of the growing predominance of "economist-technicist" conceptions were manifold. They helped to give prevalence to the idea that in building socialism what was most important was "building its material basis," and that it was necessary to adopt a policy of accelerated industrialization in which absolute priority must be given to heavy industry. These conceptions favored the decisive role attributed to the development of machine production and "modern" technology: hence the slogan of the 1930s, "technique decides everything,"[58] which opened the way for strengthening the position of the technicians and granting a privileged role to "science" and scientists.
Above all, conceptions such as these inhibited the role of proletarian class struggle and revolutionary mass action, replacing it with the struggle for production and for the development of the productive forces, which were expected to produce the most radical social changes, including the disappearance in due course of the division between manual and mental labor.[59]
The growing predominance within the Bolshevik ideological formation of the conceptions mentioned was due fundamentally to the contradictions which were developing in the Soviet formation, and the limited means available to the Bolshevik Party for dealing with them through action by the masses. Under these conditions the Party, in order to cope with the problems confronting it, strove to increase production as quickly as possible by means of technological changes, and it expected that these would result in ideological changes that must strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In this way, oblivion came to be increasingly the fate of
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Marx's analyses showing the necessity, if the revolution was to advance, of ideological changes that were not at all the outcome of technological changes, but rather of revolutionary mass struggle, smashing the old social and ideological relations and making possible the building of new relations. Such a struggle was not a "struggle of ideas" but a class struggle, destroying old practices and old social relations, realized in ideological apparatuses, and making possible the building of new relations and new practices.
As regards the formation and development of ideas, that is, of ideological relations and the practices associated with them, we must distinguish between Marx's writings about the ideas which correspond to a mode of production which is already dominant and those which deal with the development of revolutionary ideas.
The writings in which Marx deals with the "dominant ideas" are the better known -- such as the passage where he says that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force."[60] If the writings that Marx devoted to the dominant ideology are the most numerous, this is because it was of decisive importance politically, in the period when he was writing, to combat the idealist prejudice according to which the dominant ideas could be "swept away" without struggling against the material domination of the class whose dominance was strengthened by these ideas. The fewness of the writings in which Marx deals with the development of revolutionary ideas is due no doubt, to the very small amount of experience available in his time that was relevant to the conditions for this development, the conditions enabling the proletariat to exercise its ideological hegemony.[61]
In any case, the analyses of Marx,[62] and also those of Lenin, devoted to the conditions for the development and appropriation of revolutionary ideas by the masses are relatively few. However, quite apart from the relative frequency or infrequency of a particular kind of writing in Marx's works, what accounts for the pushing into the background, in the Bolshevik
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ideological formation, of the decisive and indispensable role of action by the masses in the changing of social relations in general, and ideological relations in particular, is the increasing role played in reality by the State, which gave rise to the idea of the "revolution from above."
This idea appeared in fairly clear-cut form for the first time in the resolution of the Sixteenth Party Conference which ratified the First Five-Year Plan. This resolution declared that the building of socialism required the concentration not only of the forces of the Party and of the working class but also -- what was new -- of the forces of the State.[63] In this resolution the building of socialism was shown as calling not for the development, first and foremost, of the initiative of the masses, and consequently the withering-away of the state -- what Marx meant when he showed that the State is a power separated from the masses, appropriating their forces in order to use these against them -- but, on the contrary, and contradicting the lessons of the Paris Commune and of The State and Revolution, for strengthening of the State.[64]
In this way there emerged the thesis of a "revolution from above," to be accomplished not by the masses but by the State, on the "initiative" of the latter, to which the masses were merely to give their "support."
The idea of the "revolution from above" was explicitly present in the official account of the large-scale collectivization carried out from the end of 1929 on. Speaking of this, the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) approved by the CC declared that, "The distinguishing feature of this revolution is that it was accomplished from above, on the initiative of the state, and directly supported from below. . . ."[65] However, we know from Marx and Engels that a "revolution'' accomplished from above, even if it be supported by the masses, is no true revolution.[66]
Thus, at the end of the NEP period, the role of the State became primordial, both in reality (where it was determined
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by the evolution of class relations, which favored the development of the most up-to-date techniques and the State's centralization of financial resources) and in the Bolshevik ideological formation. At this second level we observe a profound transformation of this ideological formation, which entailed increasing departure from the positions of revolutionary Marxism as these were set out in the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (especially in The State and Revolution ).[67]
It is not possible to review here all the passages in revolutionary Marxism which deal with the question of the State, especially in relation to the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, these passages and the theses they set forth are so important, and they were so thoroughly inhibited from the Bolshevik ideological formation from the end of NEP on, that a few of them must be mentioned.
The first point to be recalled is that "the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" is only that in so far as it is, at one and the same time, a state and not a state, with the second aspect more important than the first, and becoming more and more important as proletarian power is strengthened. Hence Engels' remark in March 1875, in a letter to Bebel: "The whole talk about the state should be dropped, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. . . . We would therefore propose to replace state everywhere [in the Gotha Programme] by Gemeinwesen, a good old German word which can very well convey the meaning of the French word 'commune.'"[68]
Marx's observations in The Civil War in France are also highly significant. They deal with those features of the proletariat's political rule which make it possible for this rule to become increasingly a non-state, by causing the separation between the machinery of government and the masses to disappear. In the conjuncture of the class struggles at the end of the 1920s these very features (which had not been strongly present in the preceding years) tended themselves to disappear.
In The Civil War in France, drawing lessons from the Paris
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Commune, Marx contrasted the forms of proletarian rule with state forms which make possible the oppression and exploitation of the working people. He shows how the "centralized state machinery," with its "military, bureaucratic" and other organs, "entoils [enmeshes] the living civil society like a boa constrictor." To this machinery there corresponds "the regulated plan of a state power, with a systematic and hierarchic division of labour." It gives rise to a "state interest" which is administered by a bureaucratic body of "state priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions." Marx sees this bureaucratic body as a "deadening incubus," "a host of state vermin," which "serves as a means of annihilating . . . all aspirations for the emancipation of the popular masses."[69]
Analyzing the Paris Commune, he shows that it not only brought about the elimination of the bourgeoisie's political power but was also a revolution against the State itself. He says explicitly: "This was . . . a revolution not against this or that, Legitimate, Constitutional, Republican or Imperialist form of state power. It was a revolution against the State itself, of this super-naturalist abortion of society," upon which is based a "centralised and organised governmental power usurping to be the master instead of the servant of society." It was because it was a revolution against the State, "the reabsorption of the state power by society . . . by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organised force of their suppression," that the Commune was "the political form of their social emancipation," or "the political form . . . of the liberation of labour from the usurpation [slaveholding] of the monopolists of the means of labour." Marx explains that "the Commune is not the social movement of the working class . . . but the organised means of action." It "does not [do] away with the class struggles through which the working classes strive for the abolition of all classes, and therefore of all [class rule] . . . but it affords the rational medium in which the class struggle can run through its different phases in the most rational and humane way. It could start
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violent reactions and as violent revolutions. It begins the emancipation of labour -- its great goal -- by doing away with the unproductive and mischievous work of the state parasites. . . ."[70]
We know that, after October 1917, the Soviet political system, which at first reproduced many of the features of the Paris Commune, underwent changes which resulted in the masses becoming more and more separated from the organs of power. Lenin analyzed this evolution at the time and stressed the necessity of returning to the principles of the Commune -- though, in the complex situation at the end of "war communism" this necessity seemed to him less urgent than the efforts which were indispensable if the country was to be saved from famine and chaos.[71] During the NEP period the need to go back to the principles of the Paris Commune was reasserted, but without this resulting in any definite proposals. It was mainly a question of "restricting" and "checking on" bureaucracy rather than of doing away with it. After 1928-1929, when rapid industrialization together with collectivization taking the form of a "revolution from above" were seen as the first-priority tasks, there was no more talk of the Paris Commune. On the contrary, emphasis was laid upon strengthening the State and on the authority of its functionaries, integrated in a highly hierarchical system of relations. This was a change in the Bolshevik ideological formation which inhibited an essential component of revolutionary Marxism.
This inhibition did not take place in the "realm of ideas," it was the result of real changes and, above all, of uncontrolled contradictions which led to increasing use of coercion in dealing with the masses. The strengthening of state forms of rule which accompanied this process, together with the support given by a section of the masses to the policy of collectivization and industrialization, did indeed make it possible to obtain a certain number of remarkable material results. This contributed to the development of voluntarist illusions, which we have already noted were characteristic of the period which
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saw the end of the NEP and the beginning of the implementation of the First Five-Year Plan.
Identification of juridical forms of ownership with production relations, against which Lenin had warned the Party,[72] and which was related to the "illusions of jurisprudence" spoken of by Marx,[73] was, as we know, one of the essential features of the "simplified Marxism" which was tending to become dominant in the Bolshevik ideological formation. After the end of the 1920s the significance of a certain number of theses of revolutionary Marxism concerning the problems of forms of ownership and forms of appropriation was increasingly obscured. The development of Marx's views on this subject, therefore, could not but be "forgotten." This circumstance makes it necessary for me to recall what the nature of that development actually was.
Fundamentally, until the beginning of 1850, Marx and Engels stressed the role to be played by state ownership in the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. This was their position in the Manifesto. After 1850, however, formulations concerning state ownership became less and less frequent, and what Marx and Engels put in the forefront was the concept of social appropriation. Thus, in his 1895 introduction to The Class Struggles in France, Engels pointed out that it was in this book, and in The 18th Brumaire that Marx first declared himself for "the appropriation of the means of production by society."[74] Considering the role previously assigned by Marx to state ownership, and the contrast later so firmly made by him (especially after the Paris Commune) between "state" and "society," this formulation is highly significant.
However, the Bolshevik ideological formation as it was at the end of the 1920s "overlooked" this distinction, for practical purposes. The twofold result was that production relations
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were identified with ownership, and state ownership with social appropriation.
In fact, these identifications had seemed "obvious" to many Party members since the period of "war communism." This "obviousness" acquired new, decisive importance from the end of 1925 on, in connection with the increasing role of state intervention in the economic basis (the first annual plans, in the form of "control figures," the increase in investment by way of the state budget, etc.). Numerous undialectical formulations regarding the working of the state-owned enterprises made their appearance.
This happened, for example, in Stalin's political report of December 1925 to the Party's Fourteenth Congress. In this report, as we know, the problem of the socialist character of the state-owned enterprises was approached in an undialectical way, in the form of questions and answers, along the lines of "either this or that," and not of "this and also its opposite."[75]
Yet the problem lay precisely in the fact that, under conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the state-owned enterprises could be both socialist enterprises (because of the leading role that the working class could play in them) and state-capitalist enterprises, in so far as the specific form of working-class rule is not a state form, and in so far as the bourgeoisie had not disappeared but only changed its form of existence. The bourgeoisie was also present in the state-owned enterprises because of the reproduction in them of the capitalist division of labor and the distribution relations corresponding thereto, and so, likewise, of "bourgeois right."[76]
Actually, the identification, purely and simply, of state ownership with social appropriation, and the failure to distinguish between form of ownership and production relations, prevented the making of analyses that were essential if a clear-eyed struggle was to be waged against the development of a new bourgeoisie within the enterprises and in the machinery of the State and the Party. This bourgeoisie was one of a new type, in that it did not possess juridical private property -- a circumstance, which did not hinder it, however, from dispos-
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ing, de facto, of the means of production.[77] And it is facts that count, not juridical categories.
During the struggle waged by the Bolshevik Party from 1926-1927 on in order to subject the development of the productive forces to an overall plan, a conception became strengthened which tended to counterpose the "plan" to the market in an undialectical way.
The consolidation in the Party's thinking of this ideological pair of terms, "plan" and "market," contributed to an increase in the internal contradictions of the Bolshevik ideological formation and blunted the capacity to analyze the real contradictions.
To grasp the nature of the problems involved here, we need to begin by reminding ourselves what the system of relations was that was formed between enterprises during the NEP period, and which was to be reproduced later in a new form. Basically, these were commodity relations, and that was true as well of the relations between the enterprises and their workers. The first set of relations took the form of price and the second the form of wages. These forms were engendered by the contradiction between the private and independent character ("working for oneself") of the work performed and the social character of production.
However, as a result of the development of Gosplan's activity and the framing of the economic plans, commodity relations assumed two contradictory forms. On the one hand, a form with prices and wages which seemed to proceed from the "free" functioning of the "market" and the forces which come into conflict therein; on the other, a form corresponding to the fixing "by the plan" of prices, wages, and (in principle) quantities of goods to be produced.
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In so far as commodity relations survived, with the conditions ensuring their reproduction, these were two forms of existence of commodity relations. One of these forms implied that the economic basis was operating in comparative independence; the other, that the operation of the economic basis was subjected, more or less completely and really, to political imperatives. These were two forms of motion developing on the basis of one and the same contradiction -- that which was expressed in the existence of prices and wages. One of these forms tended to "resolve" the contradiction a posteriori (ex post ), the other to "resolve" it a priori (ex ante ). These forms of motion, based upon the same contradiction, were therefore, although contradictory, not mutually exclusive. What tended to separate them was that the first form ensured its own reproduction whereas the second could help to prepare (given conditions going beyond "planning" and involving transformation of the production processes themselves) its own disappearance, by helping to make production a directly political activity: direct production for society, which implies a plan that is no longer based upon commodity relations but results from cooperation between the producers on the scale of society.[78]
Correct treatment of the contradictory unity of two forms of commodity relations requires that the existence of this unity and of these contradictions be acknowledged, and, consequently, that the "plan" (in the conditions in which it is formulated and put into effect) not represented formally as a category "external" to commodity relations, as the realization of "the essence of organization."
In the conditions of the fierce struggle that was waged from the end of the 1920s on to ensure "domination by the plan," however, an ideological slippage took place which tended to present this "domination," even when prices and wages still existed, as equivalent to the "abolition" of commodity relations. This ideological slippage was also connected with the strengthening of the state bourgeoisie in process of formation (constituted within the apparatuses of the State and the Party) through practices which gave priority to accumulation over
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the initiatives of the direct producers, to dead labor over living labor. This ideological slippage was conditioned theoretically by inhibition of the primacy of contradiction over unity.[79]
The idea of economic planning as "abolition" of commodity relations "obliterates" one of the essential conclusions to be drawn from Marx's analyses, namely, that commodity and money relations can disappear only as the result of a long struggle culminating in an overturn of production relations, political relations, and ideological relations, and "the appropriation [by man] of his own general productive power."[80]
This "obliteration" implies that the contradictory unity of the two forms of existence of commodity relations is now thought of as signifying opposition between two "objects," the "plan" and the "market," and that decisive significance is attributed to this opposition. By seeing the "contradiction between plan and market" in this way one loses sight of the primary importance of class contradictions as well as of the conditions, objective and subjective, necessary for the disappearance of commodity and money relations and the development of production which is directly social, and therefore dominated by politics.
The ideological forms which developed under these conditions tended to identify the struggle between the capitalist road and the socialist road with the struggle between the "anarchy" of the market and "harmonious development" ensured by planning. These ideological elements are seen explicitly at work in the writings of Preobrazhensky, who contrasted "the law of value" (associated with "private economy") and "the socialist planning principle" (associated with the "state sector" of the Soviet economy).[81]
According to this economist, the extension of planning is bound up with the struggle "to increase the means of production belonging to the proletarian state," so that, under the conditions of the NEP, when a non-state economy existed, it was necessary to struggle "for the maximum primitive socialist accumulation."[82]
Thus, instead of the real problem of the struggle between
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the capitalist road and the socialist road, we find formulated, undialectically, the contrast between the law of value and the "planning principle," between private economy and state economy. The extension of the latter is somehow expected automatically to inhibit commodity, money, and capitalist relations, and engender an entirely new reality, analysis of which is no longer to be a matter for political economy (or for historical materialism), but for "a different science which is itself transitional between political economy and social technology,"[83] one which replaces analysis and treatment of contradictions with handling of problems of "organization."
The ideas expressed by Preobrazhensky were formally rejected by the Bolshevik Party, but, in fact, the conception employed in The New Economics influenced the Party to an increasing extent. There developed toward the end of the 1920s an ideology which regarded the plan as a "form of organization" that was capable by itself of "transcending" social contradictions. This ideology helped to "subordinate" the treatment of class contradictions to the "fulfillment" of the objectives of economic plans, and brought in its train some profoundly negative social and economic consequences, especially in strengthening the influence of the "technicians," "organizers," and "planners.
In an apparently paradoxical way, the myth of a plan capable of "transcending" social contradictions helped to strengthen the monetary and financial illusions which had already developed at the beginning of the NEP.[84] An ideological element thus took shape which was utterly alien to Marxism, even in its most superficial forms.
The strengthening of monetary and financial illusions was manifested vigorously in 1927-1928. It led to the idea that the problems of industrialization would be "solved" as soon as the financial resources needed for industrialization had been obtained. This "monetary illusion" caused the higher political authorities to fail to reckon with the indications provided by the forecasts of material balances -- to regard it as unimportant that these forecasts revealed the prospect of a series of shortages and bottlenecks making materially impracticable some
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of the projects which it was possible to "finance." From the spring of 1927, under pressure from increasingly acute contradictions and the "state-of-emergency" atmosphere which was developing, the monetary illusion became more and more dominant: money now being formally "subordinated" to the "plan," the power to "deal with contradictions" which was attributed to the latter seemed to reinforce the illusory "power" of money. Hence the surprising result that, through the combination of planning with money, exchange value came to predominate over use value. In this way a component of the Bolshevik ideological formation appeared which encouraged the Party leaders to set targets that were materially unrealizable. Part of the planning apparatus, more directly at grips with the material problems involved, tried to oppose this tendency -- but less and less vigorously, because such opposition was soon labeled "anti-Soviet activity."
In 1930 the role of the monetary illusion was such that the Gosplan journal published an article in which this appeared: "The planning of investments is based on costs expressed in money terms. The elements of material and technological concretisation are almost entirely absent. The plan presents exclusively the money credits assigned for building and equipment: as for what equipment will be needed, and when such-and-such machinery will be required, that will become clear only in the course of the execution of the plan."[85]
Closely linked with the ideological factor mentioned was the slogan which appeared at that time: "tempos decide everything." According to this formula, the higher the growth rates, the better the situation. This slogan complemented the monetary illusion. It expressed the ruling preoccupation with "quantity": quantitative growth was more important than the changing of social relations, and the latter was appreciated essentially for the "quantitative" effects which were expected to follow from it.[86]
In reality, the stress upon "quantity" is also, in another form, a feature of the "technicist" ideology. That these ideological forms could play so important a role in the system of ideas and in the practice of the Bolshevism of the late 1920s
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testifies to the depth of the political and ideological crisis resulting from the breakdown of the worker-peasant alliance which was beginning to happen at that time. This crisis incited to a "flight forward," bound up with the illusion that, thanks to technology, organization, planning, and money "subordinated" to planning, a whole series of objectives would become attainable.
And so the internal contradictions of the Bolshevik ideological formation were deepened, and positions were strengthened that were in conflict with revolutionary Marxism -- with the Marxism-Leninism which was the theoretical basis of Bolshevism.
At the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the existence of the contradictions in the Bolshevik ideological formation which have been discussed above contributed to the strengthening of other ideological and political elements that were also alien to revolutionary Marxism. These were the ideological and political effects of the contradictions mentioned, and it is these that we must now examine.
What is covered by the expression "ideological and political effects" must be explained through two preliminary observations:
(1) I here call "ideological effects" a certain number of changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation which were connected with the previous ones, in that they were "necessary" in order to maintain a certain coherence among the increasingly dominant ideological forms and between these and the Party's practices. These effects concerned mainly the status and structure of dialectical materialism.
(2) I here call "political effects" the consequences entailed,
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on the political plane, by the growing role which the changes already examined assigned to certain ideological notions such as that of the Party's "monolithic" character. More broadly this expression refers to the political role of the Bolshevik ideological formation in its changed form.
Essentially, the changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation tended to inhibit some of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, to reduce Bolshevism's ability to use revolutionary Marxism as an instrument for analyzing reality. Under these conditions, the Bolshevik ideological formation in its changed form served, with ever greater frequency, to "justify" after the act the adoption of political lines which were no longer based on a rigorous concrete analysis of reality. It then functioned as a "system of legitimation," as a grid of ideological notions which one "applied" to reality, and not as a set of concepts to be used in a living analysis. This was one of the consequences of the appearance in the Soviet Union of a "simplified" or "congealed" form of Marxism,[87] which departed from revolutionary Marxism.
In the last analysis, of course, the changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation and its role resulted from objective contradictions, and from class contradictions first and foremost. In their turn, however, through not having been subjected to critical analysis, these changes reacted upon the Soviet social formation by impoverishing the Marxism upon which the Bolshevik Party relied, and favoring both a mechanistic view of reality and interventions which had effects other than those the Party expected -- effects of major political importance.
We must stress here an essential point, namely, that these "political effects" did not apply only in the USSR, but also tended to operate on the international plane : for the Bolshevik ideological formation, with the changes that it underwent, was the ideological form through which the Comintern and its various sections defined, as a rule, their political line. The changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation nevertheless played such a role internationally only in so far as they corresponded, at bottom, to the types of relations which the Comintern's sections maintained with the realities of their
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own countries, and to the practices to which these sections were committed. The best proof (a contrario ) of this is offered by the fact that the changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation and in the ideology of the Comintern failed to produce the same effects (development of sectarianism and of ouvrièriste and ultraleft attitudes) in the Chinese Communist Party (which was linked increasingly with the peasantry and engaged in revolutionary war) as it did in the Communist Parties of Europe and America. That became quite clear after 1935, when the Chinese Communists developed their revolutionary line on a broad front, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.
Among the various changes in the Bolshevik ideological formation which ensured a certain degree of coherence among the ideological notions which tended to become dominant from the late 1920s, the most important was the affirmation of a principle of totality. This was, indeed, the first principle affirmed by Stalin in his exposition of "the Marxist dialectical method."[88]
According to this principle, dialectics regards nature as "a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena, are organically connected with, dependent on and determined by each other."[89]
"Nature" is thus presented as an organic totality in which coherence and unity take precedence over contradiction. This being so, one cannot understand any of the changes undergone by the objects and phenomena which make up nature if these changes are "isolated from surrounding phenomena."
Correlatively with the idea of an organic totality there is thus affirmed an interdependence of phenomena, presented through the concept of an environment which is supposed to condition every phenomenon.[90] External causes of change take precedence of internal causes. When, only at the end of his exposition of the "principal features" of Marxist dialectics,
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Stalin says that "internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature," and that the conflict of opposites "constitutes the internal content of the process of development,"[91] this appears as a mere supplement to a body of principles already set forth, and is not articulated with them. It serves as a mode of "observation" and not as a principle of explanation.
The fundamental question of the unity of opposites is thus not raised, so that the propositions put forward in Stalin's essay are remote from those which Lenin formulates in his Philosophical Notebooks, especially when he says: "In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites."[92]
The political consequences of the conception of dialectical materialism expressed by Stalin are all the more important because, after describing "the Marxist dialectical method" in relation to "nature" in the way we have seen, he proceeds to "the extension of the principles of dialectical method to the study of social life."[93] The ways in which this extension is effected are not very explicit, but Stalin's formulations, including those devoted to historical materialism, show that "society," too, is to be seen as an organic whole, the development of which is due to external causes operating as an environment.
The "development of society" thus appears to depend mainly upon the changing of its relations with nature, these relations consisting above all in the productive forces, so that the development of the latter is seen as the driving force of social changes.[94]
The notion of organic totality presumes that unity takes precedence over contradiction. The more this notion became dominant in Bolshevik writings of the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the more "society" appeared to be an "organization" or a "system," so that the Party's interventions in the social
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process tended to be thought of not in terms of dealing with contradictions but in terms of "measures of organization and planning" of the social process. Hence the slogan of the 1930s: "Organization decides everything." Along with this there appeared many formulations resembling those of Bogdanov[95] (whose theses were nevertheless formally condemned). But this "convergence" must not lead us to an idealist interpretation which would one-sidedly stress the Bogdanovist "origin" of these formulations.
To be sure, the influence of Bogdanov's ideas upon many Bolsheviks is undeniable, and it is not hard to find formulas directly borrowed (perhaps "unconsciously") from Bogdanov. Thus, in his Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Stalin used a typically Bogdanovist expression when he speaks of the "organising . . . value of new ideas."[96]
What is essential, however, is the set of social conditions which caused ideas resembling Bogdanov's to acquire ever greater importance from the late 1920s on. These conditions were due to a certain situation in the class struggle which accorded decisive weight to the State as the apparent "organizer" of social changes.[97]
The thesis of the dominance of unity over contradiction (inherent in the idea of "society" functioning as a "totality" whose transformations are determined by changes in its relations with the "environment") holds a central position in the altered conception of "dialectical materialism" which emerged (implicitly or explicitly) after the late 1920s. This thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction tended to play a decisive ideological role in so far as it was "extended" or "applied" to whatever might be considered as constituting "an object." It thus tended to inhibit Lenin's thesis that "the splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts . . . is the essence (one of the 'essentials,' one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics."[98]
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The thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction is "rightist-leftist" in character. Depending on the conjuncture of the class struggle, it functions either as a "conciliatory" thesis providing a "basis" for renunciation of struggle, especially inside the Party (in the name of unity at any price ), or, as was the case at the end of the 1920s, as a thesis providing a "basis" for sectarianism, for "ruthless struggle" (in the name of a unity which seems preservable only by excluding all contradiction ). The first type of effect is rightist, while the second looks as though it is "left," by virtue of the "rigorousness" of its consequences: it implies negation of the diversity of contradictions, and of their universality.
In the situation of extreme tension which existed at the end of the NEP period and at the beginning of the 1930s, the thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction was accepted by the majority of the revolutionary elements in the Party and the working class, and it developed "ultraleft" effects.
A few concrete examples will serve to show what these effects were in the conjuncture of the period.
The most immediate effect (which was one of "legitimation") concerned the conditions in which the Party worked : it, corresponded to the assertion of the political thesis of the necessarily monolithic character of the Party.
The theme of the "monolithic" character of the Bolshevik Party was actually tackled in a systematic way at the end of, 1928. It played a key role in Stalin's speech of November 19.[99] In this speech he correctly pointed out the difference of principle separating the Bolshevik Party from the Social Democratic parties (in their class basis, in their ideology, and in the organizational forms resulting from these). However, when speaking about the way the Party worked, he "summed up" this difference not by referring to the role of democratic centralism but by mentioning the necessarily "monolithic" character of the Party.[100] But the idea of a "monolithic" party not only conflicts with the experience of Marxism-Leninism, it is illusory. The Party is inevitably traversed by contradictions especially by those forced upon it by its role as the instrument through which the proletariat is able to unite the broad masses under its leadership, so that, in one way or another, the
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interests of the different strata making up these masses produce an effect within the Party. Divergent points of view necessarily appear when these contradictory interests have to be evaluated, and the problem is how to arrive correctly at an agreement between views reflecting the differing aspirations of masses whose support is needed if the revolution is to continue to progress. This was why Lenin wrote, in his Letter to the Congress : "Our Party relies on two classes and therefore its instability would be possible and its downfall inevitable if there were no agreement between these two classes."[101]
If the "monolithic principle" is carried to its logical conclusion, the Party deprives itself of the means of uniting the broad masses, because it is led to reject, in practice, the principle of democratic centralism. This latter principle presupposes, indeed, that different ideas can be centralized after being examined and critically discussed. Genuine application of this principle demands recognition of the need to ensure the contradictory unity of centralization and democracy, and of the fact that the first term can possess meaning only under the domination of the second. "Monolithism" rejects this principle in the name of a formal "unity" which is to be secured, in an always illusory way, by means of ruthless struggle. This struggle to obtain "perfect" unity tends to weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat, isolate the working class from the rest of the masses, intensify administrative coercion of the masses, and develop the machinery of repression.
In the short term, one-sided stress on unity and centralism at the expense of democracy may make it possible to win quick successes, especially in the field of industry and technology. In the long term, it produces effects which are harmful to the working class, and even to the leading role of the Party. The strengthening of the machinery of repression tends to develop its independence of the Party, and to increase its interference in Party life, especially in connection with purges. Eventually, therefore, the fight for "monolithism" becomes a weapon in the class struggle, a weapon which, after it has made it possible "to solve rapidly" a certain number of problems, serves the bourgeois forces in society, because it hinders consolida-
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tion of the Party's leading role and its strengthening through clear ideological struggle.
While the thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction serves to "legitimize" a "monolithic" conception of the Party, it is obviously not what "produces" this conception. The latter develops on the basis of objective conditions : it is essentially a consequence of the development of class struggles which the Party is unable to direct, and which it can affect only by strengthening its unity through coercion.
This was shown by the changes which were introduced into the way the Bolshevik Party worked after the Kronstadt rebellion, the strikes at the beginning of 1921, and the peasant revolts of the winter of 1920-1921, in a period when Lenin said of the peasantry that "their dissatisfaction with the proletarian dictatorship is mounting."[102] In a period such as that was, Lenin considered that the rules which had governed the Party's functioning until then should be modified, and oppositional activity within the Party reduced.[103] It was then that measures were adopted which restricted this activity. Nevertheless, opposition was not forbidden but regulated, and means of expression were provided for those who disagreed with the majority.[104] There was then no question of any "monolithic" conception of the Party. However, the measures taken in the particularly difficult situation at the beginning of 1921 could serve as the starting point for practices aiming at "monolithism."
Actually, all through the NEP period, opportunities to express divergent views within the Party were being restricted more and more, so that gradually they ceased to have anything in common with what had once been normal practice. The immediate reason for this change in political relations was the Party's weakness in the rural areas. This was seen as the sign of a still dangerous situation which gave reason for seriously limiting the scope for discussion in the. Party. This situation tended to obscure the idea that it could be right to swim against the stream. It often caused oppositionists themselves to renounce the expression of their views, and even to say that they could not be in the right "against the Party." In this way a
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certain practice became established, of which Trotsky gave an example when, while not repudiating his views, he nevertheless declared, before the Thirteenth Congress (in 1924): "Comrades, none of us wishes to be right, or can be right, against his Party . . . I know that one cannot be right against the Party. One can be right only with the Party and through the Party."[105] Although discussions did still take place during the NEP period, none of them was carried through to the end : disciplinary measures were taken before the theoretical roots of the divergences had been revealed and the Party as a whole had given its judgment on the substance of the problems involved. The main reason for this was not -- at the beginning, at least -- the "disciplinary" measures applied to oppositionists, or the repression to which they were subjected. What was dominant, and explains why the discussions were not carried through to the end, or were conducted in language comprehensible only to a few, was the concern common to all sides to affirm the unity of the Party, a concern dictated above all by the Party's difficult position in the countryside, and fear lest this should threaten the Soviet power.
The result was that the unity which was achieved remained formal. It was not based on an ideological struggle which could have made for a unity that was profoundly real, and consequently the same debates kept on starting up again. The conception of unity which was formed in this way assumed acceptance, implicitly at least, of the primacy of unity over contradiction. This was the terrain on which arose the thesis of "monolithism," an idealist thesis which denied the universality of contradictions and the need for living unity in the Party.
The principle of "monolithism" was asserted when the situation became especially dangerous, owing to the peasants' resistance to the emergency measures. During the years of extreme tension connected with the collectivization of agriculture "from above," this principle became a dogma, for the tension caused the Party to unite its forces as much as possible, not on the basis of broad discussion but in the form of obedience or constraint.[106]
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The specific conditions under which the Soviet revolution developed caused a tendency to appear very soon which, in imagination, identified the Bolshevik Party with the proletariat. These conditions were, especially, those which Lenin described when he said in 1919 that the soviets, instead of being "organs of government by the working people, are in fact organs of government for the working people by the advanced section of the proletariat. . . ."[107]
This phrase of Lenin's reflected a real state of affairs. He was to refer to it again and again, until his very last writings, and to appeal for the situation to be changed. This appeal was still finding echoes in the NEP years, with the efforts that were made to "revitalize" the soviets.[108]
Lenin's words clearly acknowledge that there was a difference between "the advanced section of the proletariat" and the working people as a whole. He did not identify the one with the other, even while claiming that the Party was the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Many of Lenin's writings emphasize that this instrument cannot be identified with the proletariat, and that contradictions may develop between them, contradictions which only the practice of a mass line can prevent from deepening.
While the concrete problems raised by the relations between the Party and the class were not "solved" by the formulations of the years 1919-1922, their existence was, nevertheless, admitted, and some elements of solution (though necessarily still only provisional) were put forward. In 1923 and the following years these problems continued to be debated, but the terms in which these debates were conducted did not usually help to clarify them. Indeed, the tendency to "identify" the Party with the proletariat grew stronger and stronger. Thus, the Twelfth Party Congress adopted a resolution declaring that "the dictatorship of the working class cannot be assured otherwise than in the form of dictatorship of its leading vanguard, i.e., the Communist Party. "[109]
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This identification implied that recognition of the role and place of contradiction was replaced by the thesis of an abstractly presented unity, denying the existence of differences and contradictions.
It is significant that one of the most systematic defenders of this conception was Zinoviev, who, as we know, wavered between openly rightist positions and "ultraleft" ones. One of the passages in which the identity between the State, the working people, and the Party was asserted most formally by Zinoviev reads as follows: "The State is the workers, the advanced section of the workers, the vanguard. We are the State![110]
In 1924 Zinoviev gave formal expression to the same theme when he wrote:
The consensus of opinion about the dictatorship of the proletariat can be expressed in the following propositions. It is the dictatorship of a class if we look at the matter from the social and class point of view. It is the dictatorship of the Soviet state, a Soviet dictatorship, if we look at the matter from the point of view of juridical form, i.e., from the specifically state point of view. It is the dictatorship of a party if we look at the same question from the point of view of leadership, from the point of view of the internal mechanism of the whole vast machine of a transitional society.[111]
This formulation implies identification of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the Soviet state and the dictatorship of the Party. It obliterates, in illusory fashion, the problems which arise from contradictions between class and Party, between class and state, and between state and Party. Such an identification can be conceived only if one's theoretical premise is the primacy of unity, and even of identity, over contradiction.
In a number of his writings of 1924 Stalin opposed this identification and reaffirmed the thesis that the Party was the "instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat." At that time, however, the conditions necessary if the Party was to remain that "instrument" were not actually stated.[112]
At the beginning of 1926, in Problems of Leninism, Stalin
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returned to this question, again refusing to identify the Party with the proletariat:
Although the Party carries out the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat is in essence the "dictatorship" of its Party, this does not mean that the "dictatorship of the Party" (its leading role) is identical with the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the former is equal in scope to the latter. . . . Whoever identifies the leading role of the Party with the dictatorship of the proletariat substitutes "dictatorship" of the Party for the dictatorship of the proletariat.[113]
Stalin went on to admit, explicitly, that contradictions could develop between the Party and the working class if certain conditions were not fulfilled.[114]
When, however, at the end of the NEP period, contradictions became acute between the Party and the various sections of the people, including the working class, these contradictions were not frankly analyzed, but passed over in silence.
This silence implicitly accepted the thesis which had been explicitly rejected, identifying the Party with the proletariat. This implicit identification gradually became dominant, providing a theoretical "basis" for the practice of "revolution from above."
The process of identifying, in imagination, the State with the Party and both with the proletariat (and later the Party with the whole people), by continuing to develop, in objective conditions which aggravated the contradictions between the Party and the masses, led increasingly to the idea that any opposition to the Party line (and even any criticism of the line) must be due to the activity of "enemies of the people."
Given these conditions, asserting the primacy of unity and denying the universality of contradiction resulted increasingly in denial also of the existence of contradictions among the people. Thereafter, all opposition seemed to originate in external contradictions, connected with the imperialist environment. Any divergence of view was opposition, and any opposition was the act of a foreign agent. Such conceptions were the product of objective contradictions the existence of
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which was denied, they were determined by practices which placed the Party above the masses, but the thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction (presented as a "Marxist" thesis) was the theoretical condition thanks to which the social practices in question could be thought of as arising from the needs of a proletarian policy.
The thesis of the primacy of unity over contradiction was the condition making it possible to twist Lenin's thesis on the revolutionary proletarian Party, to change the thesis of the union (always contradictory) between Marxist theory and the Party[115] into a thesis of the unity (without contradictions) of these two. This change tended to come about as soon as the principle was accepted that the Party was necessarily "always right,"[116] thereby withdrawing the Party from criticism by the masses -- and the Party leadership from criticism by the rank and file. When this happened, as it did in the USSR in the late 1920s, the Party alone had the right to state what was or was not "theoretically correct," and, in order to eliminate any risk of "divergent interpretations," to concentrate "authority in matters of theory" in the Party leadership. This concentration reduced the possibility of genuine development of Marxism, even if the Party leadership was defending a revolutionary line, for this development calls for broad ideological class struggle and the opportunity for different analyses to be debated.[117] The tendency to equate the Party with Marxist theory (of which it is seen as the embodiment) leads, if persisted in, to the weakening of Marxism. The existence of such a tendency in the USSR had objective bases, as we know, but it did not seem "acceptable" except on the basis of the primacy of unity over contradiction.
At the same time, the identification of the Party with Marxist theory caused the Party to be less and less alert to initiatives and ideas coming from the masses, though such alertness is essential if theory is to be enriched and mistakes put right. A
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process thus began which caused the Party to act no longer as an educator itself in need of educating, but as an "authority" giving orders. The development of this form of action favored the use of repression against some sections of the people, so as to "bring" them to follow the Party's directives, even when they were not ready to do this.
The transformation of dialectical materialism by inhibiting the primacy of contradiction over unity brought with it the possibility of another ideological effect, namely, the identification of theory with reality. The need for practice and scientific experiment tended consequently to be denied: theory was supposed to be capable, by itself, of "saying what is." When it functioned in this way, dialectical materialism in its changed form appeared to be a "science of the sciences," capable of deciding what was "science" and what was not, and seeming even to offer the possibility of "deducing" scientific knowledge from its own principles. This was the function that "dialectical materialism" tended to fulfill in and after the 1930s, when it served to "settle" scientific disputes -- for example, to "legitimise" Lysenko's conceptions in the name of abstract principles.[118]
The identification of theory with reality, if taken to its logical conclusion, is equivalent to an idealist position: it eliminates the revolutionary implications of dialectical materialism and gives victory to a fundamentally conservative notion, namely: "All that is real is rational." Dialectics tends to operate no longer as an instrument for criticizing and changing "what is," but as an instrument for legitimizing it.[119] When we analyze the way "dialectical materialism" functioned in the USSR after the end of the 1920s, we see that a tendency pointing in this direction became more and more active. The objective basis for this tendency was the system of social contradictions which was developing at that time, and the place that the Bolshevik Party occupied in that system through the practices in which it engaged, especially because of the
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weakness of its relations with popular initiatives, starting with those of the peasant masses.
Toward the end of the 1920s an "evolutionist" interpretation of Marx's theory dominated the Bolshevik Party more and more. To appreciate the change that this entailed in the Bolshevik ideological formation we need to recall that Marx's theory is something quite different from an enumeration or description of the "stages" through which every "society" necessarily has to pass.[120]
Marx categorically repudiated this interpretation, as when he replied, in 1877, to criticisms of his theory formulated by the Russian writer N. Mikhailovsky.[121] Speaking of this writer, Marx says:
For him it is absolutely necessary to change my sketch of the origin of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical theory of Universal Progress, fatally imposed on all peoples, regardless of the historical circumstances in which they find themselves, ending finally in that economic system which assures both the greatest amount of productive labour and the fullest development of man. But I must beg his pardon. This is to do me both too much honour and too much discredit. In various places in Capital I have alluded to the destiny which overtook the plebeians of ancient Rome. They were originally free peasants cultivating each on his own account his own parcel of land. In the course of Roman history they were expropriated. The same movement which separated them from their means of production and subsistence brought about not only the formation of the great landed estates but that of great holdings of money capital as well. Thus, one fine morning there were on the one hand free men deprived of everything except their labour power and, on the other, to exploit this labour, the holders of all acquired wealth. What happened? The Roman proletarians became, not wage-earners, but an idle mob . . . and beside them there developed a mode of production which was not capitalist
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but based on slavery. Thus, events which were strikingly analogous, but which took place in different historical circumstances, led to entirely dissimilar results. By studying each of these evolutions separately, and by comparing them afterwards, the key to these phenomena can easily be found, but one will never succeed with the "open sesame" of an historico-philosophical theory of which the supreme virtue consists in its being supra-historical.[122]
Marx here comes out categorically against any interpretation of his analyses which tends to make of them an "historico-philosophical theory" imposing on every people the necessity of passing through a determined succession of modes of production. In his correspondence with Vera Zasulich, Marx was to condemn once more, in 1881, the idea of an "historical fatalism" making every people pass through a succession of the same modes of production.[123]
Marx's theory rules out any "general theory of the evolution of human societies," because it recognizes that social reality is characterized not by the existence at each moment of one simple contradiction but, on the contrary, by a real multiplicity of contradictions.
The reduction of the movement of history to a succession of simple contradictions, necessarily engendering each other in a predetermined order, corresponds not to the movement of materialist dialectics but to that of Hegelian dialectics. Though the latter does not rule out an apparent diversity of contradictions, it assumes that all the contradictions present at one time in a "society" are merely the "expression" of one fundamental contradiction. Such a conception leads to the idea of "linear" and "irreversible" development.
The Marxist characterization of social formations by the existence of a real multiplicity of contradictions implies, on the contrary, that systems of specific contradictions may take shape, which develop under particular conditions, and in which this or that element may, at any given moment, play a dominant role.[124] The real multiplicity of contradictions conditions the possibility of several paths of "development," of periods of "stagnation" or "retreat," the form and duration of
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which depend on the way in which the class struggles concretely proceed, especially on the ideological plane.
At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, under the impact of the reformist practices of the principal parties belonging to the Second International, the influence of idealism tended to obscure the radical difference between Marx's theory and any sort of "evolutionism." Thereafter, all reforms were conceived as being "contributions" to a fated "evolution." The influence of the evolutionist ideas of Darwinism and Positivism obviously helped, also, to "inhibit" the specific nature of Marx's analyses, the impossibility of reducing them to any sort of evolutionism.
Marxism-Leninism eliminates everything which, by distorting Marx's theory, may reduce it
3. The Bolshevik ideological formation
and its transformations
I. The internal contradictions of the
Bolshevik ideological formation
(a) The economist-technicist conception of
the productive forces and the primacy
accorded to the development of
technology [17]
(1) "Development of the productive
forces" and "development of society"
(2) The conception of "social development"
as an effect of the development of the
"productive forces," and Marx's
analyses
(3) The objective basis of the increasing
predominance in the Bolshevik
ideological formation of a conception of
"social development" set in motion by
technological changes
(b) Ideological changes and technological
changes
(c) The idea of the "revolution from above"
(d) Juridical form of ownership and
production relations
(e) The contradictory forms of existence of
commodity relations and the illusory
"treatment" of the contradictions
connected with these forms
II. The ideological and political effects of
the development of the internal
contradictions of the Bolshevik
ideological formation
(a) Organic totality, interdependence, and
contradictions
(1) The fight for socialism and the fight for
contradictions
(2) The dominance of unity over
contradiction
(3) The tendency to identify the Party with
the State and with the proletariat
(4) The tendency to identify the Party with
Marxist theory
(5) The identification of theory with reality
(b) The tendency to reduce Marxism to a
form of "evolutionism"